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State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations 
S u p r e m e Court 
In Re: REQUEST OF HIS EXCELLENCY, THEODORE 
FRANCIS GREEN, GOVERNOR O F T H E 
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVI-
DENCE PLANTATIONS, FOR AN OPINION AS 
TO THE VALIDITY OF LEGISLATION FOR 
THE CALLING AND HOLDING OF A CON-
STITUTIONAL CONVENTION. 
SUPPLEMENTAL SUGGESTIONS 
BY 
THOMAS F . COONEY 
State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations 
S u p r e m e C o u r t 
In Re: Request of His Excellency, Theodore Francis 
Green, Governor of the State of Rhode Island and 
Providence Plantations, for an Opinion as to the 
Validity of Legislation for the Calling and Holding 
of a Constitutional Convention. 
SUPPLEMENTAL SUGGESTIONS 
By 
T H O M A S F . COONEY 
The writer respectfully suggests supplemental to what is 
set out in his brief in regard to the obsolescence of Art. XIII 
of the Constitution consideration of the following: 
"The said propositions shall be, by said clerks, inserted 
in the warrants or notices by them issued, for warning 
the next annual town and ward meetings in April; and 
the clerks shall read said propositions to the electors 
when thus assembled," etc. 
Taylor vs. Place, p. 360. The word "shall" used in Art. 
XIII is mandatory upon the town and city clerks to perform 
the several acts referred to in the manner and at the time 
prescribed and not otherwise. 
Those provisions of the Constitution contemplated the an-
nual town meeting of historic periods when and where all 
the electors assembled at one place, or had an opportunity 
to do so, and, while thus convened, be informed by the town 
clerk of the proposal to amend the Constitution before vot-
ing thereon. That period expired with the termination of 
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the ox cart days. It is almost as extinct as the dodo which 
Webster's Unabridged Dictionary defines as— 
"A large heavy flightless bird now extinct. * * * Its ex-
istence is recorded as late as the year 1681." 
The anachronism of Art. XIII in this respect is demon-
strated when the Court considers that the City of Providence 
has seventy-seven voting districts. For the purpose of Art. 
XIII each of them is to be considered a separate township, 
the electors in which are entitled to have the warrant con-
taining the proposed amendment read to them by the city 
clerk at the same moment when and as they are all assem-
bled in each district. 
This, of course, is absolutely impossible. The electors in 
one district have no right to be present at any other than 
the one in which they are located by the Board of Canvass-
ers for the City of Providence. They can not all be in at-
tendance at one and the same moment in the same district. 
With this situation present, how can the city clerk, in the 
words of Art. XIII, 
"read said propositions to the electors when thus as-
sembled,"? 
Is it not obvious that that Article reflects a period wholly 
out of harmony with the present day conditions? 
So far as the writer is informed, there is but one authentic 
case recorded where the same person was present at two 
places at the same moment. It is the miracle referred to 
Saint Anthony of Padua. 
In Vol. 1, Catholic Encyclopedia, p. 557, it is stated as fol-
lows: 
"After having been Guardian at Le-Puy (1221), we find 
Anthony in the year 1226, Custos Provincial in the 
Province of Limousin. The most authentic miracles 
of that period are the following. Preaching one night 
on Holy Thursday in the Church of St. Pierre du 
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Queriox at Limoges, he remembered he had to sing a 
Lesson of the Divine Office. Interrupting suddenly his 
discourse, he appeared at the same moment among the 
friars in choir to sing his Lesson after which he con-
tinued his sermon." 
The Court will observe that nothing short of a miracle ex-
plains the incident in which Saint Anthony figured. Inas-
much as the age of miracles has long since gone by, it would 
be interesting to determine, if he were living now, how he 
could perform the duties imposed upon the city clerk of 
Providence under the terms of Art. XIII, which mandatorily 
require his presence at seventy-seven places at the same mo-
ment. It is apparent that the Constitution requires amend-
ment in no Article as much as in Art. XIII. in order to have 
it a practicable measure. 
It is to be observed that the term "district" as distin-
guished from "town" and <4ward" meetings did not come into 
the Constitution until 1900. 
Art. XI. Sec. 2, "Of Amendments", adopted in November 
of that year, for the first time, included— 
"and district meetings on the Tuesday next after the 
first Monday in November annually." 
When the Constitution was adopted in 1843 such a sub-
division of the State was unknown. In the course of time 
it became necessary to create it in order to expedite elec-
tions : 
At the argument, Mr. Sherwood stressed the conserva-
tism of our "venerated ancestors" in the matter of giving 
them time to think over a proposal to amend the Constitu-
tion reflected in the fact that after the matter passed the 
assembly, it was to come before the electors at the "next 
annual town and ward meetings in April." 
"If a majority of all the members elected to each house. 
at said annual meeting. shall approve any proposition 
thus made, the same shall be published and submitted 
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to the electors in the mode provided in the act of ap-
proval, and if then approved by three-fifths of the elec-
tors of the State present and voting thereon, it shall be-
come a part, of the Constitution of the State." 
The period during which the electors may ponder the pro-
posal to amend, before they can act, even if they were unani-
mous in their desire to do so, is extended by at least one year 
beyond that which is provided in Art. XIII. 
This is so because of Art. XVI, Sec. 1, "Of Amend-
ments", adopted in November 1911, which provides 
for biennial elections of members of the General Assembly. 
No such period was contemplated by the framers of the Con-
stitution in 1842. It is obvious that such a delay in connec-
tion with such an important matter as changing the Consti-
tution, which proposal may be unanimously acceptable to 
the electors, awaiting only an opportunity to express their 
approval thereof, renders it inefficacious by the unreason-
able lapse of time necessarily involved in the substitution of 
the period applicable to the biennial election for that pre-
scribed by "said annual meeting". 
In a word, even if all the electors agree in regard to the 
merit of a proposal to amend the Constitution, nevertheless 
and notwithstanding, they can not act thereon earlier than 
the next biennial election. There is no such thing as "said 
annual meeting" at which to choose "a majority of all the 
members of each house" whose approval is indispensable be-
fore the proposal can "become a part of the Constitution of 
the State." 
Because of Art. XVI, Sec. 1, "Of Amendments", which 
deals with biennial elections, meritorious proposals to 
amend the Constitution agreed to unanimously by the Gen-
eral Assembly in the first instance; and, for the purpose 
of the argument, also by the unanimous vote of the elec-
tors at the first biennial election held subsequent to 
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the submission of the proposal by the assembly for all prac-
tical purposes, may as well be referred "Ad Kalendas 
Graecas—To the Greek Kalends—i. e., never." 
Our predecessors did not foresee, when writing Art. XIII, 
the changed conditions with which this generation is con-
fronted. They overlooked the maxim: 
"Tempora mutantur et nos mutamur in illis." 
"Times change and we change with them." 
The mandatory provisions of Art. XIII of the Constitu-
tion are absolutely impossible of execution at this time. No 
substitute therefor has been provided. Each and all of them 
must be performed in accordance with the express mandate 
of the Constitution in order to have them become a part 
thereof. The omission to carry out any one of the several suc-
cessive steps provided in Art. XIII renders abortive any at-
tempt to have a proposal of amendment adopted legally ex-
cepting always the right of the people to adopt such meas-
ures submitted to them even though it be unconstitutionally 
done. The truth of this is demonstrated upon a momentary 
scrutiny of Art. XIII. 
Hence the absolute impracticability at this time of an at-
tempt to amend the Constitution in accordance with its 
terms. It simply can not be done. 
Articles XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX, 
and X X "Of Amendments" are valid notwithstanding that 
they were not adopted in compliance with Art. XIII. They 
were submitted to the people and adopted by them, even 
though it was irregular in the first instance. 
As pointed out in the Attorney General's brief, p. 14, 
quoting former Chief Justice Marcus Morton, of the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: 
"Whether we sit regularly or irregularly, whether by 
right or usurption. if the people choose to adopt what we 
submit to them, it then becomes valid." 
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The same argument is advanced by Mr. William P. Shef-
field, Sr., in the introductory part of his article in reply to 
the statements of Judge Bradley and Abraham A. Payne. 
It is to be observed that the briefs of Messrs. Sherwood, 
Tillinghast, and Chace contain considerable matter in which 
they claim that Art. XIII of the Constitution is the sole 
medium of amending it available at this time. The conten-
tion of the writer to the contrary was argued in their pres-
ence on the 17th inst. Neither of them questioned its valid-
ity then. 
Now that it has been brought to their attention, they 
should be permitted, if they desire, as officers of the Court, 
to present their views on that subject. They might respond 
to an invitation to them by the Court to offer such consider-
ations in writing as they may wish to submit, if any, in an-
swer to the writer's assertion that Art, XIII is now wholly 
obsolete and it is impracticable, if not impossible, to make 
use of it as they claim. 
The writer has furnished Mr. Sherwood and Mr. Tilling-
hast with a copy of the suggestions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THOMAS F . COONEY. 
State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations 
Supreme Court 
IN RE: CALLING OF A CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION 
THIS BRIEF IS PRESENTED TO THIS COURT BY 
THOMAS J. FLYNN AND JAMES W. LEIGHTON, 
AT THE INVITATION AND ON BEHALF OF HON. 
ROBERT E. QUINN, LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR OF 
THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND. 
Its Purpose is to Show That the General Assembly Has 
Power to Call a Constitutional Convention; That the 
Advisory Opinion to the Contrary Was Clearly Wrong 
As a Judicial Decision; That the Majority Always Has 
the Right and Power to Make and Alter the Constitu-
tion; That Thorough Revision Can Be Made in No 
Other Way; That This Doctrine is Strictly in Accord 
With the Provisions of the Existing Constitution and of 
Article I, Section 1, More Particularly; That the Consti-
tution Framed By This Convention Should Be Submit-
ted to the Vote of the Electors, and Should Become the 
Law of the Land if Approved By a Majority of Those 
Voting Thereon, As Was the Case, When the Existing 
Constitution Was Adopted in 1842. 
T H O M A S J . F L Y N N , 
J A M E S W . LEIGHTON, 
Counsel. 
State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations 
S u p r e m e C o u r t 
In Re: Calling of a Constitutional Convention 
THIS BRIEF IS PRESENTED TO THIS COURT BY 
THOMAS J. FLYNN AND JAMES W. LEIGHTON, 
AT THE INVITATION AND ON BEHALF OF HON. 
ROBERT E. QUINN, LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR OF 
THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND. 
Its Purpose is to Show That the General Assembly Has 
Power to Call a Constitutional Convention; That the 
Advisory Opinion to the Contrary Was Clearly Wrong 
As a Judicial Decision; That the Majority Always Has 
the Right and Power to Make and Alter the Constitu-
tion; That Thorough Revision Can Be Made in No 
Other Way; That This Doctrine is Strictly in Accord 
With the Provisions of the Existing Constitution and of 
Article I, Section 1, More Particularly; That the Consti-
tution Framed By This Convention Should Be Submit-
ted to the Vote of the Electors, and Should Become the 
Law of the Land if Approved By a Majority of Those 
Voting Thereon, As Was the Case, When the Existing 
Constitution Was Adopted in 1842. 
Article 1, Section 1, of our constitution expressly de-
clares, in the words of the Father of his Country, that 
"the basis of our political system is the right of the 
people to make and alter their constitutions of govern-
ment; but that the constitution which at any time ex-
ists, till changed by an explicit and authentic act of 
the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all." 
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The foregoing is not a preamble, but it is a part of the 
constitution itself, and is clearly a declaration of a right 
which is reposed in the people of the State. 
To make and alter their constitutions are very significant 
words, and clearly mean that by an explicit act of the whole 
people a new constitution may be set up, or an existing one 
altered. If the people of the State desire to make a new 
constitution, the right is reposed in them to do so by said 
Article 1, Section 1, and a constitutional convention, com-
posed of delegates chosen by the electors, and the result of 
whose labors will be submitted to the electors for approval 
or rejection, is a proper and convenient medium to initiate 
the process which will enable the people to act and speak 
authentically. This method is perfectly consistent with or-
derly government as is evident from the fact that in the 
early days of our State no question of its propriety was 
raised, and the present constitution was drafted by a con-
vention. 
If in said article 1, Section 1, elaborate, detailed provi-
sions had been inserted, setting forth the procedure to be 
followed by the people in order to make and alter their con-
stitutions of government, no implication drawn from any 
other part of the constitution would be allowed to stand in 
the way of the people exercising their said rights. We sub-
mit that the absence of such elaborate, detailed provisions 
does not render any less absolute and secure this expressly 
recognized right. Details are properly omitted from a 
written constitution, the law making body being the proper 
branch of government to carry into effect the principles 
stated and the powers and rights granted or reserved, by 
appropriate legislative action. 
I t will undoubtedly be claimed, however, that it has al-
ready been decided by the justices of this court that the 
general assembly has no power to call a constitutional con-
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vention because they have already said so in their advisory 
opinion rendered March 30th, 1883 and reported in 14 R. I. 
at page 651. In passing it may be noted that the speed 
with which the questions were decided almost brought an 
apology from the court, as it stated on page 655: 
"The questions are extremely important, and we 
should have been glad of an opportunity to give them 
a more careful study, but under the request of the 
Senate for our opinion without any unnecessary delay, 
we have thought it to be our duty to return our opinion 
as soon as we could, without neglecting other duties, 
prepare it ." 
To rely on the court's advisory opinion is the common 
device of those not desiring a constitutional convention, and 
they shield themselves behind that opinion, professing that 
respect for the opinions of the court requires acceptance 
of the principles therein stated. 
Having such profound respect for the court, why do they 
not also defer to the court's own declaration and recogni-
tion of the fact that such advisory opinions have no weight 
as precedents? 
In the case of Allen vs. Danielson, 15 R. I. 480, after a 
full hearing, with arguments and citations of authorities 
on both sides, this court reversed their own advisory opinion 
on the same subject in 13 K. I. 9, giving as one of their 
reasons for doing so, the fact that the question in 13 R. I. 9, 
"Was a petition for an opinion on a case stated, and 
was doubtless submitted without full argument or 
presentation of authorities * * * But we have no 
doubt that we should have decided the case differently 
if we had before us, when we decided it, the same array 
of authorities which we have before us now." 
In Taylor vs. Place, 4 R. I . 324, the same question came 
before the Supreme Court, in an actual case, that the judges 
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had previously given a written opinion upon, to the gov-
ernor. The court, by Ames, C. J. said: 
"This is the first time, since the adoption of the con-
stitution, that the question has been brought judicially 
to the attention of the court. The advice or opinion 
given to the governor or to either house of the assembly, 
under the third section of the tenth article of the con-
stitution, is not a decision of this court; and given as 
it must be, without the aid which the court derives in 
adversary cases from able and experienced counsel, 
though it may afford much light from the reasonings 
or research displayed in it, can have no weight as a 
precedent" 
Thus the supreme court of this State has, therefore, de-
cided on two occasions that an advisory opinion of its mem-
bers is not conclusive, and may be reversed when the same 
matter comes before the court in an actual case. 
We submit that the court is likewise justified in not being 
bound by a previous advisory opinion when requested for a 
second advisory opinion on the same subject. 
Reason and logic lead to this conclusion. 
The delegates to the constitutional convention held in 
1842, in omitting to prescribe how a constitutional conven-
tion may be called, knew, or may be supposed to have known, 
the prevailing custom of calling such conventions by legis-
latures, and that the practice present in 1842, in this and 
other States, fixed this as a part of the accepted law of 
the land. In fact the convention in which they met had 
been brought into being by action of the legislature. 
We adopt a construction that gives effect both to Article 
1, Section 1, and to Article XIII of the constitution. It 
gives effect thereby to the absolute and unlimited right of 
a majority of the people to make and alter their constitu-
tions of government, as expressly stated in Article 1, Sec-
tion 1. It gives effect, also, thereby to Article XIII, stating 
1 
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the limited manner in which one branch of the government, 
the general assembly, may initiate amendments to the con-
stitution. But for the express limitation upon the power 
of the general assembly therein contained, the usual majori-
ty of the general assembly could propose amendments for 
the approval for the usual majority of the electors. They 
are forbidden to do so, except by a majority of all the 
members elected to each house in two successive general 
assemblies. A self-imposed limitation is also placed upon 
the power of the electors, preventing them from acting by 
the usual majority, and requiring the assent of three-fifths 
of the electors voting thereon, before any amendment thus 
proposed shall become a part of the constitution. To ex-
tend Article XIII by implication into an abrogation of the 
expressed right reserved in Article 1, Section 1, is to violate 
the well known rule of construction requiring effect to be 
given, if possible, to all provisions of an instrument. 
Instead of following the rule thus stated, the advisory 
opinion of the judges enlarges the scope and operation of 
Article XIII, beyond anything ever contemplated by its 
framers, makes it exclusively by what it thus finds impliedly 
in it, and thereby entirely abrogates and excludes Article 1, 
Section 1, thus depriving the people of their expressly re-
served right to make and alter their constitution of govern-
ment. It is not thus that constitutional guarantees are to 
be construed. 
In view of these facts and principles, still insisting that 
the general assembly has the power to call a constitutional 
convention, and denying the right is prohibited by the ad-
visory opinion, which we claim is clearly erroneous and 
does not have the force and effect of a decision, we respect-
fully urge this court to so decide. 
Article 1, Section 1, of the constitution of Rhode Island 
begins: 
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"In the words of the Father of his country, we de-
clare that the basis of our political systems is the right 
of the people to make and alter their constitutions of 
govern m en t " * * * 
The right of the people to make and alter their constitu-
tion of government could not be more expressly stated or 
more explicity reserved. I t is an unqualified, absolute right. 
The framers put it in the first part of the written consti-
tution, as the very right of all rights. Nothing can deny 
or destroy it. I t is there, fixed and unalterable, and it 
only remains to give it force and effect. 
This might have been done by inserting a clause in the 
constitution providing the means for carrying it into effect. 
Failure to find, however, in the constitution any written 
directions as to procedure does not abrogate the right. 
There is the right of the people stated clearly and the 
trainers must have concluded that this right would be 
effected in the usual manner, namely a convention. 
The usual rule of construing such statements of rights 
and express reservations of powers in a written instrument 
is to give them full force and effect by broad construction 
and interpretation. Their scope is not to be narrowed by 
implication or restriction, but they are to be enlarged and 
given full effect in securing the freedom of the subject and 
the preservation of his rights and privileges with all the 
consequences flowing therefrom. 
It is in this spirit that all the other statements of rights 
in our bill of rights are always construed and carried into 
effect. 
In pursuance of this general policy of the law, it has 
always been held that the legislature has the power to pass 
laws to carry into effect the powers granted or reserved in 
the bill of rights. 
In Article 4, Section 1, of the present constitution we 
find the following: 
"This constitution shall be the supreme law of the 
State, and any law inconsistent therewith shall be void. 
The general assembly shall pass all laws necessary to 
carry this constitution into effect." 
Under said section, we submit that the general assembly 
has ample authority to legislate for the purpose of bringing 
a constitutional convention into being. 
The right of the people is expressly reserved by Article 1, 
Section 1, and the words "The general assembly shall pass 
all laws necessary to carry this constitution into effect" 
are sufficiently broad to justify the legislature in passing 
such legislation as may be convenient for providing the 
orderly means for the people to act. 
Also in Article IV, Section 10, we find the following pro-
vision : 
"The general assembly shall continue to exercise the 
powers they have heretofore exercised, unless prohibited 
in this constitution." 
There is no doubt that prior to the adoption of the present 
constitution, the general assembly had the right to call a 
constitutional convention, for the present constitution was 
drafted by a convention brought into being by legislative 
action. It , therefore, follows that the general assembly still 
has such power unless it is prohibited by the constitution. 
The advisory opinion of the court, above referred to, says 
that Article X I I I prohibits the legislature from providing 
for a constitutional convention. 
We submit that this conclusion is erroneous, and as pre-
viously stated, the framers of our constitution were per-
fectly familiar with the convention method, and if they 
intended that the amending article was to be in substitution 
of that method, they most certainly would not have left the 
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prohibition to implication, but would have stated it posi-
tively. 
Plenty of specific prohibitions are set forth in the consti-
tution, for instance: the government is divided into three 
branches and the scope of each is defined; the legislature is 
prohibited from passing any ex post facto law, or law im-
pairing the obligations of contracts (Article 1, Section 12) ; 
the general assembly is denied power to incur state debts 
to an amount exceeding fifty thousand dollars, except in 
time of war or insurrection, without the express consent 
of the people (Article IV, Section 13) ; lotteries are pro-
hibited (Article IV, Section 12) ; and the right of the people 
to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed (Article 1, Sec-
tion 22). 
Other examples of prohibitory features could be cited, 
but these seem sufficient to point out that the framers of 
our constitution were able to prohibit in clear language, 
and did not leave to inference. If it had been their intent 
to prohibit the changing of the fundamental law of the State 
in any other way than that set forth in Article XI I I , they 
would have said so in clear prohibitory language just as 
they did in the examples cited above. The convention meth-
od of making a constitution is not prohibited by any part 
of the constitution, and hence, it being a power possessed by 
the general assembly prior to the adoption of the present 
constitution, it is still possessed by the general assembly un-
der and by virtue of the terms of Article IV, Section 10. 
The general assembly of the State has, therefore, the 
power to pass all legislation necessary to give effect to the 
expressly reserved right of the people to make and alter 
their constitution or government. One of the most appro-
priate, natural and common means to effect this end is the 
issuance of a call to the people of the State to elect dele-
gates to meet in a convention to make such alterations 
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in the constitution as may be necessary, and to submit the 
result of their labors to the approval or disapproval of the 
electors, when a necessity arises for revising the constitu-
tions. As necessary means to this end the general assembly 
may provide the time, mode, and manner for the election 
of such delegates and for the submission of their labors to 
the electors, and, if their vote be in the affirmative, the time 
when the new constitution shall take effect. All this was 
done in connection with our present constitution. 
These are implied powers of the general assembly in the 
premises, resulting from the general grant of legislative 
powers to this department of government, contained in 
Article IV and the inherent and indefeasible right of the 
people, to make and alter their constitution of government, 
which, as it happens in this State, is also in the written 
constitution, an expressly stated right. 
Whenever, therefore, the general assembly is satisfied that 
it is time a new constitution should be framed, it has the 
right and the power, yes, even more, the duty, to call a 
constitutional convention. 
I t is a matter of common knowledge that public opinion 
has for years considered the need of a new constitution. 
The general assembly has considered the subject year after 
year in one form or another, as for example by the questions 
put to the judges in 1883, and by authorizing the appoint-
ment in 1897 by the governor of a commission to draft a new 
constitution by amending the old one, and by resolving on 
January 27th, 1897; 
"There is a widespread feeling among the people of 
the State that the constitution should be carefully and 
thoroughly revised, and such changes as seem to be de-
sirable, in view of the changed condition of affairs since 
it was adopted, properly and carefully prepared." 
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The right of the people to make and alter their constitu-
tion of government being absolute and being expressly 
stated, no limitation can be placed upon it by finding such a 
limitation implied in another clause of the constitution. 
Hence, to contend that this right can only be exercised 
after proposal of an amendment by the majority of all the 
members elected to each house of two successive general 
assemblies, would be to place an implied limitation in the 
declaration made in Article 1, Section 1, by the makers of 
our constitution. 
Let us, therefore, see how it would read: 
THE BASIS OF OUR POLITICAL SYSTEMS IS 
THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO MAKE AND 
ALTER T H E I R CONSTITUTION OF GOVERN-
MENT; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THIS RIGHT OF 
THE PEOPLE IS SUBJECT TO THE WILL OF 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN THE MANNER 
PROVIDED IN ARTICLE XII I . 
The absolute right expressly secured to the people (and 
this means a majority of the people) is to be defeated by 
an implication that what was meant that it could not be 
exercised unless proposed by a majority of all the members 
of each house of two successive general assemblies, and ap-
proved by a three-fifths majority of the electors. This is 
to substitute, first, the will of the general assembly for the 
will of the people; and, second, the will of three-fifths for 
the will of a majority of the people. Is it thus that ex-
pressly stated sovereign rights are to be hedged in by impli-
cation ? 
Rather should a way be sought to give effect to both 
clauses of the constitution, and this, it is submitted can 
easily be done by restricting the operation of Article X I I I 
to the case of amendments proposed by the general assembly, 
leaving Article 1, Section 1, to apply to everything outside 
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of such amendments proposed by the people's agent, the gen-
eral assembly. Surely a construction is to be preferred 
that shall give full force and effect to both clauses of the 
constitution rather than a construction that shall extend 
the operation of one clause to the extinction of the other 
clause, especially when the effect is to enlarge by implica-
tion the power conferred upon the people's agent, the 
general assembly, while completely extinguishing the ex-
press power reserved in the other to the people in their 
sovereign capacity. 
It is submitted that Article X I I I relates only to amend-
ments through the initiative of the general assembly, and 
has nothing to do with Article 1, Section 1, reserving ex-
pressly the right of the people (not the general assembly) 
to make and alter their constitution of government. In this 
view Article X I I I is something extraneous and additional 
to Article 1, Section 1, providing not how the people may 
make and alter their constitution of government, but how 
the agent of the people, the general assembly, may initiate 
or suggest amendments, and providing further what sanc-
tion of the people shall make such suggested amendments 
a part of the constitution. 
These repeated acts of the general assembly, before the 
present constitution was adopted, in calling constitutional 
conventions, show that when the constitution was framed, 
with the express statement in it that the people have a right 
to make and alter their constitution of government without 
providing specifically how this was to be done, the framers 
of the constitution took it for granted that the general 
assembly could do what it had done before, i. e., call a con-
stitutional convention whenever the necessity might arise. 
Article X I I I provides that an amendment that has been 
passed by two successive general assemblies by a majority 
of all the members elected to each house, and is approved 
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by a three-fifths of the electors voting thereon, shall there-
upon become operative as a part of the constitution. 
Plainly this mode of amending the constitution upon 
the initiative of the general assembly has nothing to do 
with the right of the people to make and alter their con-
stitution of government, and cannot, even by implication, 
be considered as limiting that right in any way, but rather 
as setting up another and an additional manner in which, 
by the initiative of the general assembly only, can a change 
be made in the constitution. 
How can the absolute power of the people be limited 
simply by express mention of the way in which one agent 
of the people can propose amendments? Suppose i t had 
been another agent of the government that had been in-
trusted with the power. Suppose the constitution had pro-
vided that the governor or the supreme court could suggest 
or initiate amendments that should become operative when 
sanctioned by a three-fifths majority, by what rule of con-
struction could this additional mode of amending the con-
stitution be tortured into an implied negation of the ex-
pressly stated right of the people to make and alter their 
constitution of government? 
By this is meant that just as the present constitution be-
came operative when ratified by a majority vote of the 
electors, so a new constitution framed by a constitutional 
convention called by the general assembly will become oper-
ative when ratified in the same way by a majority vote of 
the electors. 
If asked, by a majority of what electors, the answer is, 
by a majority of the electors including those who will be 
qualified as electors under such new constitution. 
This is what happened when the present constitution was 
adopted. In the case of a small electorate and a new con-
stitution that greatly enlarges the electorate, if the question 
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of its adoption be left to the old electorate, no change would 
ever be made. The old electors vote always to retain their 
own special privileges. Our old charter was abrogated 
finally and the present constitution with its enlarged 
electorate was carried by the votes of the new electors— 
that is to say, it was carried by the aid of those who were 
not voters under the old system, but who became voters un-
der the new system. In the last analysis the power rests 
with those who constitute the majority. 
And when we say the people are sovereign we mean that 
their will as made manifest by the action of the majority 
of electors determines the action of the State. 
The common expression concerning the government of our 
country is that the majority governs—the majority shall 
rule. 
I t is the majority, making its demands known through 
the ballot box, that governs, and is therefore incapable of 
being abrogated or defeated. 
A sovereign power, though it may temporarily place 
limitations upon the exercise of i ts own power, can, at any 
time, resume the exercise thereof unhampered by its own 
self-imposed limitations. The limitations placed by a sov-
ereign power upon the exercise of its own powers are not 
binding upon itself except in so f a r as i t may choose to obey 
them. The creation of self limitations by a sovereign power 
is no bar to their abolition by the same sovereign power. 
This is no argument for adopting a new constitution dif-
ferent from that provided in the instrument itself, such as 
in this case, extending beyond the express statement of the 
people to make and alter their constitution of government, 
even though the constitution is silent as to how this right 
may be carried into effect. 
I t so happens that other States of the Union have changed 
their constitution in a manner different from that provided 
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in the previous constitution. Delaware did in 1791; and 
Maryland, in 1850 are examples. The defense offered for 
the course is most able and is entirely convincing. 
In State vs. Dahl, 6 N. D. 81, Corliss, J., says: 
" I t is unnecessary for us to express any opinion on 
the question whether Sec. 202 of the constitution pre-
scribing the mode of amending the same prevents the 
lawful assembling of a constitutional convention in 
this state to revise the fundamental law. The decided 
weight of authority, and the more numerous precedents 
are arrayed on the side of the doctrine which supports 
the existence of this inherent legislative power to call 
a constitutional convention notwithstanding the fact 
that the instrument itself points out how it may be 
amended." 
In Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. St. Stowe, J., says: 
"There is underlying our whole system of American 
government a principle of acknowledged right in the 
people to change their Constitutions, except where espe-
cially prohibited in a Constitution itself, in all cases 
and at all times, whether there is a way provided in 
their Constitution or not, by the interposition of the 
legislature, and the calling of a convention, as was done 
in the case in hand. The offspring of revolution 
originally, but restrained and modified by the necessity 
arising out of the new principle established in this 
country, by the accomplishment of our national inde-
pendence, that the people are the government, and not 
the king, and the source of all political power,—it has 
become legitimated, and without mention in our Con-
stitution, is as much the law of the land as if specifically 
set out in them; and that as a solemn recognition of 
this, and not as a revolutionary right, the section of 
the Declaration of Rights in our own, and similar 
clauses in other state Constitutions, were inserted." 
If a majority of the people has not the power to make a 
constitution binding forever or for a specific term of years, 
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how can it have the power to make it binding forever unless 
changed by more than a majority? 
Whence can be derived the notion that a majority at any 
one time has more power than a majority at any other time? 
But it will be argued, if this be so, how can we give effect 
to Article X I I I of our constitution providing for the adop-
tion of amendments by a three-fifths vote only? Is not this 
a limitation upon the power of the people to make and alter 
their constitution of government? 
The defense to this is, that it relates only to amendments 
initiated by the legislature and not to an entire change of 
the constitution; that the framers had this in mind when 
they drafted the instrument, and that it was intended to 
prevent the adoption by a majority only, when perhaps only 
a light vote might be cast, of an amendment or amendments 
not really coming from the people directly but suggested 
or initiated by the servant of the people, the general 
assembly. 
If a three-fifths vote or a two-thirds vote is necessary to 
effect a change, then the power is in the minority of two-
fifths or one-third to prevent it. This is inconsistent with 
the provision of Article IV, Section 4, of the Constitution 
of the United States, guaranteeing to every State in the 
Union a republican form of government; that State has 
not a republican form of government where two-fifths or 
one-third, and either can prevent three-fifths or two-thirds 
from making or altering their constitution of government. 
A republican form of government means a government in 
which the majority govern. 
Nowhere in the Constitution of the United States can a 
method be found for guaranteeing to the States a republican 
form of government. Cases are numerous, however, in the 
United States Supreme Court, in which it has been held 
that notwithstanding this absence in the constitution, the 
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power is in Congress to legislate in order to guarantee the 
rights contained in Article IV. 
In Smith vs. Nelson, 18 Vt. 511, at page 550, it was de-
cided that although voluntary associations make constitu-
tions and pass by-laws that they declare are not to be altered 
except in a certain way or manner, as by the concurrence 
of two-thirds or at two different meetings, etc., "yet this 
constitution and by-laws may at any time be altered or 
abrogated by the same power that created them, and the 
vote of any subsequent meeting, abrogating or altering such 
constitution, though passed only by a majority, has as much 
efficacy as a previous vote establishing them. A constitu-
tion for a voluntary society may be proper, as an organiza-
tion, but it has none of the powers and requisites of a con-
stitution in political bodies, which emanates from a higher 
power than the legislature, and always is supposed to be 
enacted by a power superior to the legislature, and hence 
is unchangeable except by the body which established i t ; 
but that body can change i t at pleasure" by which is meant 
that the constitution cannot be changed by the legislature, 
but the people who made the constitution can likewise de-
stroy i t ; and this implies the power to set aside by a ma-
jority a self-imposed limitation, such as that a change shall 
only be made by a three-fifths vote, or that it never should 
be amended. 
So the general assembly, by a majority vote may adopt a 
rule that it shall pass laws only by a three-fifths vote. 
But the same majority that passes such a rule can at any 
time set it aside. 
Were the provision fixed by a higher power, were it in the 
constitution of the State, the general assembly could not 
set it aside. But as a self-imposed limitation it is repeal-
able by the same power that imposed it and by the same 
majority. 
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So if a clause in a State constitution declaring that any 
vote more than a majority is necessary to change the consti-
tution, it would be a self-imposed limitation that could be 
set aside by the same power that imposed it, and that power 
is the majority of the electors as the representatives of the 
sovereign will. 
Were the provision one fixed by a higher power, were it 
in the Constitution of the United States, it could only be 
set aside by the people of the United States in the mode 
provided for amending the constitution of the United States. 
I t would no longer be a self-imposed limitation, subject to 
repeal by the same power that imposed i t ; it would be a 
limitation imposed by a higher power and subject to repeal 
only by that higher power. 
I t is well known to all who have studied the history of 
this State that the general assembly has always exercised 
enormous powers conferred on this branch of the govern-
ment under the Charter granted by Charles I I , in 1663, and 
the limited powers conferred upon the executive. 
The general assembly had judicial powers as well as legis-
lative powers conferred upon it under this charter, and the 
dual nature of the general assembly continued until the con-
stitution was adopted in 1842, and even then the exercise 
of judicial powers by the general assembly was not given up 
until i t was compelled to do so by the decision of our 
supreme court (See Taylor vs. Place, supra). 
Our forefathers would have been surprised had it been 
foretold to them that by an implied construction, quasi-
judicial only, of the section relating to amendments only, 
and initiated by the general assembly, their successors were 
to be deprived of the expressly stated right to make and 
alter their constitution of government. 
There is but one proper application of the maxim, "Ex-
pressio Unius est exclusio Alterius" in the case of our consti-
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tution, i. e., the expressly mentioned way in Article X I I I of 
the manner in which the general assembly may propose an 
amendment is an exclusion of any other way in, which they 
can propose them. To that extent the application of the 
maxim is sound. It is denied however, that framing a new 
constitution by a convention is amending the existing con-
stitution. The maxim has no real application because Arti-
cle X I I I relates to a different thing. 
As Jameson, says, 4th Ed. p. 605, "because the people 
could not do the same thing in a different way, it does not 
follow that they could not do a different thing in a different 
way." Therefore a limitation upon the power of one party 
tof do one thing in one way is no limitation upon the power 
of another party to do another thing in another way. 
Especially is this true when it is possible to adopt a con-
struction that \vill give full force and effect to both provi-
sions of the constitution. 
The objection to the construction adopted by the court is 
that it finds an implied limitation in Article XI I I , therefore 
Article X I I I is exclusive of all other methods, and hence 
denies all effect to the expressly stated power of the people 
to make and alter their constitution of government under 
Article 1, Section 1. 
I t is not thus that constitutional guarantees are to be 
construed. 
I t must be remembered also that our form of government 
is not one in which all the power is in the legislative, judi-
cial and executive branches thereof unless expressly re-
served to the people. On the contrary, all power remains in 
the people that is not expressly delegated to the three 
branches named. 
In State vs. Denny, 118 Ind. 449, Olds., J., on page 457, 
says: 
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"A constitution grants no rights to people, but is the 
creature of their power, the instrument of their con-
venience • • # a written constitution is in every 
instance a limitation upon the powers of government 
in the hands of agents." 
See also, Cooley, Const. Lims 5th Ed. 47. 
The principle always to be followed is the one expressly 
stated in Article 1, Section 1, and it is maintained herein 
that no limitation can be placed upon that principle—the 
right of the people, now and at all future time, to make 
and alter their constitution of government by the will of 
the majority of the electors. 
For the right of the people to make and alter their con-
stitution of government is absolute, and therefore cannot 
be limited, expressly or by implication. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THOMAS J . F L Y N N , 
J A M E S W . LEIGHTON, 
Counsel. 
State of Rhode Island Providence, Sr. Supreme Court 
In re: The Constitutional Convention 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THE LEGITIMACY OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
State of Rhode Island 
Providence, Sr. Supreme Court 
In re: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THE LEGITIMACY OF A 
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The judges of this court have been requested by the Gov-
ernor for their opinion in accordance with Article XI I , Sec-
tion 2, of the Amendments to the Constitution on the fol-
lowing questions: 
Would i t be a valid exercise of the legislative power if the 
General Assembly should provide by law— 
(a) Fo r a convention to be called to revise or amend 
the Constitution of the Sta te ; 
(b) That the Governor shall call for the election, at a 
date to be fixed by him, of delegates to such con-
vention in such number and manner as the Gen-
eral Assembly shall determine; 
(c) That the general officers of the State shall by 
vir tue of their offices be members of such con-
vention ; 
(d) For the organization and conduct of such Con-
vention ; 
(e) Fo r the submission to the people for their ratifica-
tion and adoption of any constitution or amend-
ments proposed by such Convention; and 
( f ) For declaring the result and effect of the vote of 
a major i ty of the electors voting upon the question 
of such ratification and adoption. 
I t is the purpose of this brief to discuss only the broad 
question of the legitimacy of effecting changes in our funda-
mental law under the present Constitution by the conven-
tion method. Specific answers to the subsidiary questions 
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propounded seem to the writer to spring spontaneously 
from the conclusion which he has reached on the main 
question. The propriety and expediency of any particular 
matters of detail seem entirely irrelevant to a consideration 
of the question of right involved. The scope of this brief 
will therefore be limited to the question of whether the Con-
stitution of Rhode Island may legally be altered, revised 
or amended by the action of a convention called under an 
act of the General Assembly when such action has been 
ratified and adopted by a vote of a majority of the electors 
voting thereon. 
If Article X I I I of the Rhode Island constitution is to be 
interpreted as an implied prohibition of action by the Gen-
eral Assembly calling a Constitutional Convention and no 
other authority of the State has power to take such action, 
it follows that the people must be said to have deliberately 
tied their own hands and given up this power which admit-
tedly they possessed prior to the adoption of the Constitu-
tion. In other words, this power of revising by the method 
of conventions their form of government and the respective 
powers of its various departments, which was up to this time 
considered of such tremendous importance and the existence 
of which was never denied by the most tory statesmen when 
authorized by the existing legislature, was abdicated by the 
people in 1842 and this surrender was made not by express 
words but by mere implication from the grant of power to 
the General Assembly to propose amendments. I t is not 
merely a limitation upon the power of the General As-
sembly to enact a certain kind of legislation but a limitation 
by the people upon themselves preventing them from exer-
cising a power by many considered inherent and essential 
and by all admitted to be of the greatest importance. 
An interpretation which would bring about such a result 
requires the most convincing reasons and the most accurate 
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demonstration. Mere legal intendments or technical argu-
ment cannot suffice to convince the mind of the necessity 
of a construction of language whose consequences are of 
such great magnitude. 
A correct analysis of the question before us discloses at 
once that two rights or powers are involved, neither one 
of which is by any logical necessity included in the other 
and the confounding together of which has been the source 
of much of the muddled thinking and even more muddled 
writing upon this subject. 
When the supreme power in any State is vested in one 
ruler, or even when it is possessed by a small body of rulers, 
that single person or that small body of persons is able to 
act in any matter directly, immediately upon his or their 
own initiative, without the intervention of any other person 
or organ of the government. If the Czar of all the Russias 
or the Sultan of Turkey possessed a right or power to make 
this or tha t change in the government of his domains he 
could merely make the change of his own motion and was 
never under the necessity of waiting for another to initiate 
the process of creating an organ through which he might 
act. When, however, the supreme power in the State is in 
a large and constantly changing body, as in a modern repub-
lic, that large and constantly changing body, the people, 
may possess rights or powers which it, from the very nature 
of its multiple membership, cannot exercise except upon the 
initiation of some other person or smaller body of persons. 
The people of Rhode Island may have the right or power to 
change its constitution but from its very nature it has not 
the means of exercising that right or power except upon 
the initiation of the General Assembly. Two rights or pow-
ers, therefore, are involved in the consideration of the ques-
tion at bar, namely, (1) the right of the people to change 
its constitution by the convention method, and (2) the 
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power of the General Assembly to provide the machinery 
for such change by an act calling a convention. 
Neither of these rights logically includes the other. I t is 
a possibility that the people might possess the right above 
ascribed to them and yet they might never have conferred 
the authority on the General Assembly to take the initiative 
in the exercise of that right. The power might be expressly 
given to the General Assembly to call a convention and yet 
it might be that the people had abdicated its right so to 
change its constitution. Of course, it is extremely unlikely 
that a situation would ever exist anywhere when one of 
these rights or powers would exist without the other; and 
when one was shown to exist the implication of the ex-
istence of the other would be almost irresistible. All that 
is here insisted upon is the logical separation of the two, a 
separation which will tend to greater clearness of thought 
in the discussion of the question and will serve to expose 
the rather subtle fallacies lurking in some of the principal 
arguments heretofore advanced against the legitimacy of the 
convention method of constitutional change in Rhode 
Island. 
I t seems to be admitted by all who have up to this time 
examined the question that the Constitution of Rhode 
Island may be altered, amended or revised by means of a 
convention followed by a vote of the electorate unless such 
action be prohibited by the terms of the Constitution itself. 
Article 1, Section 1, declares in the words of Washington's 
Farewell Address that "the basis of our political systems 
is the right of the people to make and alter their constitu-
tions of government;" Article IV, Section 2, vests the legis-
lative power under the constitution in the General Assem-
bly; and the same Article, Section 10, provides that "the 
General Assembly shall continue to exercise the powers 
they have heretofore exercised, unless prohibited in this con-
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stitution." Our present constitution and the present con-
stitutions of all of the other states in the Union were formed 
by means of constitutional conventions called pursuant to 
legislative acts. This is the natural and normal method by 
which peoples "make and alter their constitutions of govern-
ment" and was doubtless present to the mind of our first 
president when he wrote those lines. This was the method 
employed in 1842 by the people of Rhode Island in framing 
and adopting our present constitution. The people then in 
1842 possessed the right to change their fundamental law 
by the convention method and unless they have parted with 
that right they must still possess it. Likewise the power of 
initiating the process of change by calling a convention was 
in the General Assembly prior to 1842; and consequently, 
since all legislative power under the constitution is vested 
in it and since in addition it has all the powers exercised 
by the General Assembly under the Charter, unless pro-
hibited by the constitution, it follows that the present Gen-
eral Assembly must also have that power unless that power 
is excluded by some provision of the constitution itself. 
I t has long been contended and will be strongly urged 
here that there is an implied prohibition against a change in 
our constitution by the convention method contained in 
Article X I I I which reads as follows: 
"Article XI I I . Amendments. The general assembly 
may propose amendments to this constitution by the 
votes of a majority of all the members elected to each 
house. Such propositions for amendment shall be pub-
lished in the newspapers, and printed copies of them 
shall be sent by the secretary of state, with the names 
of all the members who shall have voted thereon, with 
the yeas and nays, to all the town and city clerks in the 
state. The said propositions shall be, by said clerks, 
inserted in the warrants or notices by them issued, for 
warning the next annual town and ward meetings in 
April ; and the clerks shall read said propositions to the 
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electors when thus assembled, with the names of all 
the representatives and senators who shall have voted 
thereon, with the yeas and nays, before the election of 
senators and representatives shall be had. If a ma-
jority of all the members elected to each house, at said 
annual meeting, shall approve any proposition thus 
made, the same shall be published and submitted to the 
electors in the mode provided in the act of approval; 
and if then approved by three-fifths of the electors of 
the state present and voting thereon in town and ward 
meetings, it shall become a par t of the constitution of 
the state." 
When we consider that the very constitution which con-
tains this provision was framed and proposed by a conven-
tion, that the constitutions then in force in every state of the 
union had been adopted and many of them afterwards 
amended in this same manner, and that the constitution of 
the United States itself was the work of a convention, does 
it not appear strange that, if it were intended to forbid such 
a method of change for the future, no express words of pro-
hibition were used? If constitutional conventions were con-
sidered by the framers of our fundamental law as equally 
obnoxious with ex post facto laws and laws impairing the 
obligation of contracts or as oppressive as the denial of trial 
by jury and the taking of private property without just com-
pensation, why did not this abuse equally merit an express 
denunciation? The very omission of "an explicit act" pro-
hibiting a convention in the future is a weighty argument 
that no such prohibition was contemplated by the authors 
of our constitution. 
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ARTICLE XIII NOT AN ABDICATION BY THE PEO-
PLE OF THEIR RIGHT TO MAKE CHANGES IN 
THEIR CONSTITUTION BY THE CONVENTION 
METHOD. 
As stated above the question here considered involves (1) 
the right of the people to change its constitution by the con-
vention method and (2) the authority of the General As-
sembly to provide the machinery for accomplishing this 
change. If the people's right to change its constitution by 
the convention method has been by them abdicated and abol-
ished then there will be no necessity for considering whether 
or not the legislative power to provide for the calling of a 
convention exists. The first division of this argument will 
therefore deal with the effect of Article X I I I upon the right 
of the people as the supreme power in the state to make and 
alter their constitution by means of a constitutional conven-
tion. 
That this right exists at least originally in the people does 
not admit of doubt in the American theory of government. 
I t is affirmed as a cardinal principle by all writers on Con-
stitutional Law and by all our public men from the earliest 
times of the republic who have had occasion to deal with the 
subject. I t is more or less explicity declared in the consti-
tutions of all the states and in none more clearly, though 
without the rhetorical flourishes and high sounding adjec-
tives common to such declarations, than in Article I, Section 
1 of the Rhode Island constitution. There the authority of 
Washington is invoked to the effect that "the basis of our 
political systems is the right of the people to make and alter 
their constitutions of government." Even the most eminent 
of the opponents of the view herein set forth does not deny 
the original existence of this right, for Judge Durfee, him-
self, in "Some thoughts on the Constitution of Rhode Island" 
at page 43, says: "Judge Bradley contends that the meaning 
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(of Article I Section 1) is that the people have the right 
to change the constitution by a mere majority vote, if they 
only do it through the medium of a convention and under an 
act of the General Assembly. I agree that it means this in 
its retrospective application; for our fathers proceeded in 
that manner when they adopted the present constitution." 
What is the nature of this right which originally existed 
in the people but is now alleged to have been lost? I t has 
been described as "inherent", "inalienable", "undeniable", 
"indefeasible", but these adjectives, while not devoid of mean-
ing, cast little light upon the nature of the right and seem to 
convey only the same idea as the quotation from Washington 
in Article I Section 1—that the right is "basic". One thing 
is certain. The right is not one created by the constitution; 
it is not a granted right, like the rights given the General 
Assembly, the Judiciary and the Executive, for i t belongs to 
the people and the people are grantors in the Constitution, 
not the grantees. I t is a reserved or retained right (Article 
I Section 23 of the Rhode Island Constitution) and conse-
quently must have existed in the people before and, there-
fore, independent of the constitution itself. A right which 
is the "basis of our political systems", which exists in the 
people prior to and independent of a written constitution, 
and which is a right to "make and alter their constitutions 
of government" can be nothing but that right of sovereignty, 
that supreme power, which Austin says must exist some-
where in every organized state. 
Having established the existence of the right and its na-
ture as basic and independent in origin of a written consti-
tution, it remains to consider whether such a right is capable 
in its nature of being limited and whether in fact the people 
have limited it by Article XI I I . 
That the sovereign power in a state cannot limit itself 
without thereby ceasing to be sovereign is a dogma accepted 
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by the more orthodox writers on jurisprudence and political 
science. Although the idea by no means originated with Aus-
tin, its scientific formulation is justly attributable to him. 
Dicey (Law of the Constitution, Ch. I ) defends the doctrine 
by reasons both historical and logical. I t is thus that the 
British Parliament, which is the sovereign power in the 
British Empire, is incapable from its sovereign nature of 
passing an unrepealable statute. I t cannot by an Act of Par-
liament disable itself from changing in any manner the or-
ganization of government by a subsequent Act of Parliament. 
By a parity of reasoning i t might be said that the people 
of Rhode Island cannot by any means disable themselves 
from changing their constitution by a subsequent constitu-
tional convention. 
Austin's doctrine has been said to be but a generalization 
from the workings of government in the then existing states 
of western Europe and this is doubtless the fact. I t is incon-
sistent in some respects with the theory of a divided sover-
eignty necessary to explain the existence of a Federal Union 
and seems to take no account of those limitations on sover-
eign power which are contained in the nature and form of a 
large body of persons possessing the sovereign power. Judge 
Durfee (op. cit. p. 34) denies that the sovereign power is in-
capable of limitations but in his argument quickly abandons 
the point and only demonstrates what no one ever thought 
of denying, that the granted power of the General Assembly 
might be limited. Daniel Webster in his argument in Luther 
vs. Borden (see Works of Daniel Webster, Boston, 1851, Vol. 
VI p. 225) states that the people "limit themselves by all 
their constitutions in two important respects; that is to say, 
in regard to the qualifications of electors and in regard to 
the qualifications of the elected." Mr. Webster, however, 
was not referring to limitations on the people as the sover-
eign power but only to certain qualifications, which he would 
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be the last to deny could be altered by the people by a change 
in their constitution. 
The true doctrine of the limitation of sovereign power in 
an American state appears to be that the sovereign power is 
limited and capable of limitation only in two respects; first, 
by those restrictions necessarily involved in the fact that the 
sovereignty is held by a large and ever changing body of men, 
and, second, by those restrictions imposed by membership in 
a federal union. To the first class of restrictions belong the 
principle that the people cannot, by reason of their numbers, 
act directly and spontaneously but only by means of agents 
and on the initiative of some organ created by them. To the 
second class belong those limitations on state power ex-
pressly agreed to in the Constitution of the United States 
or necessarily involved in the existence of the United States 
as a nation. 
But assuming that the people may limit their retained or 
reserved right to alter their constitution, have the people of 
Rhode Island in fact limited that right by adopting Article 
XI I I of the constitution? Is Article X I I I a voluntary re-
nunciation by the people of the right to hold a constitutional 
convention? Have we, the people, by permitting the General 
Assembly to propose amendments to the constitution abdi-
cated our right to propose changes ourselves? 
It is admitted on all sides that there is nowhere an express 
renunciation of this right which the people admittedly pos-
sessed prior to the adoption of the constitution. I t is sought, 
however, to spell out an implied abdication from the terms 
of Article X I I I by an application of the maxim: Expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius. I t is extremely difficult to see 
how this maxim has any bearing upon the question of the 
continued existence of the right in the people to amend their 
constitution by the convention method, whatever its bearing 
may be upon the power of the legislature to call a conven-
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tion, which will be discussed later. The argument seems to 
be something like this: The express authority given the Gen-
eral Assembly to propose amendments takes away or annihi-
lates the right of the people to alter their constitution by a 
convention. In other words, authority to an agent to per-
form an act which may lead to a desired conclusion deprives 
the principal of any right to effect the desired conclusion by 
any other means. The very statement seems to show the ab-
surdity of this contention when applied to the retained right 
of the people. The maxim can never apply unless the means 
sought to be excluded is of the same nature and kind as the 
means expressed. 
Judge Durfee (op. cit. p. 33) says: "Such a construction 
in the matter of a statute, will or deed is very common. The 
reader is doubtless familiar with it as applied to a mortgage 
deed with power of sale. The power is generally given to be 
exercised in a particular way, as, e. g. at auction af ter ad-
vertisement; and it has frequently been decided that a sale 
in any other way is invalid." True; but the illustration is a 
rather unhappy one for Judge Durfee's argument. The mort-
gagee's method of proceeding in foreclosing under the power 
of sale is, of course, limited to the exact way expressed in 
the power; but would Judge Durfee or anyone else contend 
for one moment that the existence of the power of sale ex-
cludes the mortgagee's right to proceed to foreclose in an-
other way e. g. by suit in equity? 
A more helpful rule of construction in this connection is 
that which provides that grants by the state are to be con-
strued most favorable to the grantor—that it is not to be 
presumed that the state intends to deprive itself of any of 
its powers of government. If this rule applies to the ordin-
ary organs of government it applies a fortiori to the people 
themselves in their character of ultimate sovereign. Here we 
have one of the reserved rights of the people which i t is at-
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tempted to whittle down by mere legal intendments and 
technical rules. The words of Chief Justice Taney in Charles 
River Bridge vs. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, apply here with 
especial force: "The object and end of all government is to 
promote the happiness and prosperity of the community by 
which it is established, and it can never be assumed that the 
Government intended to diminish the power of accomplish-
ing the end for which it was created . . . . We cannot deal 
thus with the rights reserved to the States, and by legal in-
tendment and mere technical reasoning take away from them 
any portion of that power." 
Just as "we must never forget, that it is a constitution we 
are expounding" so we must also never forget that it is a 
right of the people we are passing upon. I t is not one of 
those rights created and granted to a department of govern-
ment by the people in their constitution and frequently lim-
ited and restricted by the terms of the grant. I t is that ulti-
mate right of sovereignty retained by the grantors—the right 
to revoke or to alter the powers and authorities granted to 
their agents. Such a right the people can never be conceived 
as intending to abdicate or limit unless by the most express 
and unmistakable terms. 
ARTICLE XIII NOT A LIMITATION OF THE POWER 
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO CALL A CON-
STITUTIONAL CONVENTION. 
If, as has been demonstrated above, the people have never 
abrogated their right to change the constitution by the con-
vention method, a method which the greatest of our consti-
tutional expounders has characterized as "the only manner 
in which they (the people) can act safely, effectively, and 
wisely" (Marshall, C. J . in McCulloch vs. Maryland, 4 
Wheat. 316), then it would seem to require the most con-
vincing demonstration to convince the mind that they had 
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either neglected to provide the means of bringing about the 
election of such a convention or had deliberately forbidden 
the establishment of machinery for effectively exercising that 
right. The opponents of the view herein set forth are now 
reduced to the position of maintaining that this essential 
right of the people is merely a right without a remedy. The 
people have the right but may not exercise it. This position 
is supported not by any express words to be found in the 
constitution, but only by an ingenious and technical, though 
inherently sophistical, argument on the application to Arti-
cle X I I I of the maxim—expressio unius. 
The framers of our constitution were above all things 
solicitous that the power of the legislative branch of the 
state government should be kept at its maximum. Under 
the Charter that power was almost omnipotent; and no one 
who has any familiarity with the events of 1842 in Rhode 
Island could ever accuse the members of the convention 
which framed our existing constitution of being radical in-
novators. Can we attr ibute to them by implication alone an 
intention to diminish the powers of an assembly whose vir-
tual omnipotence it had always been their object to uphold? 
The terms in which the authority of the General Assem-
bly is granted are highly significant. First , by Article IV, 
Section 2, the legislative power under the constitution is 
vested in the two houses of the General Assembly. This seems 
to be a plenary grant of all power of a legislative nature and 
that nothing fur ther could remain undisposed of. But in 
their extreme desire to make as large as possible the power 
of this branch of the government they added to Article IV, 
Section 10, "The general assembly shall continue to exercise 
the powers they have heretofore exercised, unless prohibited 
in this constitution." This last section, if it is to be taken 
to have any effect, must mean that any residuum of govern-
mental power not granted to any other organ of government 
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was to be vested in the General Assembly. This plenitude 
of power it is now sought to cut down by restrictions to be 
implied by merely technical reasoning from the terms of Ar-
ticle XI I I . 
I t is said that, when a right or power is granted and the 
exact method of exercising that right or power is pointed 
out, that exact method must be pursued to the exclusion of 
another method which might be devised. That is the doc-
trine of the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius and, 
as a general principle for solving ambiguities in written in-
struments, its utility and soundness are not disputed. I t 
has, moreover, a legitimate function to perform in the inter-
pretation of Article XI I I . I t is its illegitimate use and ap-
plication we here oppose. 
The proper application of the maxim is this. Article X I I I 
is purely permissive; it allows the General Assembly, if it 
sees fit, to propose amendments to the constitution. I t does 
not command that it shall. The imperative is only used in 
prescribing how it shall proceed if it does decide to propose 
amendments. I t is a grant of power to the General Assembly 
to propose amendments and a prescription of how the pro-
posals shall be passed and presented to the people. This di-
rection as to how the legislature shall exercise its power is 
exclusive. I t may or may not in its discretion propose amend-
ments but, if it does it, shall do i t in the manner pointed out. 
This is the legitimate application of the maxim to Article 
XII I . 
The improper application of the maxim to the terms of 
Article XII I , which is here opposed, is that which seeks to 
make the permissive authority to propose amendments a 
reason to imply an exception from the general grant of leg-
islative power. The two things are wholly different in their 
nature and afford no possible occasion for invoking the doc-
trine. One relates to proposals of amendments by the Gen-
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eral Assembly, the other to the enacting of legislation rela-
tive to the assembling and organization of a constitutional 
convention. Neither is inconsistent with the existence of the 
other and so the existence of the one does not preclude the 
existence of the other. 
If Article X I I I were omitted from the constitution, would 
the General Assembly under its general grant of legislative 
power have authority to propose amendments to the people 
for their approval or rejection? Probably no one would 
attempt to uphold the existence of such a power. And the 
reason is clear. The power to propose amendments is not a 
legislative power at all. I t is purely an administrative func-
tion and might with equal propriety have been confided to 
some other organ of the government, as in the first Vermont 
constitution where it was vested in the Council of Censors. 
I t s non-legislative character is especially evident from the 
manner in which it is exercised. Legislative acts are sent 
to the executive for his approval or veto. Not so with pro-
posals for amending the constitution. They are complete 
upon passing both houses by the required majority. On this 
the practice of the Congress of the United States is partic-
ularly instructive. In the teeth of the last paragraph of Sec-
tion 7 Article I of the United States Constitution, resolu-
tions of this kind are not presented to the president because 
they are not considered legislative or law-making in char-
acter. When by inadvertence the Slavery Amendment pro-
posal was presented to President Lincoln and approved by 
him in 1864, a resolution was passed in the United States 
Senate declaring that this action was unnecessary, was done 
by inadvertence and should not be taken as a precedent. The 
power then to propose amendments, granted in Article X I I I 
not being a legislative power cannot be the basis for an im-
plied exception from the general legislative power granted 
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by Article IV by an application of the maxim: expressio 
unius est exclusio altering. 
Judge Durfee tells us that Article I, Section 1, of the 
Constitution was adopted as a substitute for a provision 
which was rejected and which read, "The people have an 
inalienable and indefeasible right, in their original sover-
eign and unlimited capacity, to ordain and institute govern-
ment, and in the same capacity to alter, reform and totally 
change the same, whenever their safety or happiness re-
quires." Then he makes this admission (Durfee, op. cit. p. 
46) : "If the declaratory clause, which was offered and re-
jected in the convention, which framed our constitution, had 
been adopted, we should find it difficult to maintain that the 
special provision is exclusive and controlling." Does the 
learned jurist mean that if the declaration of right were 
embellished with the adjectives "inalienable", "indefeasible", 
"sovereign" and "unlimited" he would throw overboard the 
whole labored argument, expressio unius and all, and agree 
that the General Assembly could call a constitutional con-
vention? I t is submitted that the language used in Article 
I Section 1 has exactly the same meaning as the language 
of the rejected provision though expressed in more restrained 
terms. The "right of the people to make and alter their con-
stitutions of government" is just as much a right as one 
that is characterized as "inalienable", "indefeasible" and 
"sovereign", and, under the one as under the other, it is 
equally "difficult to maintain that the special provision is 
exclusive and controlling." 
CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSTRUCTION 
Judge Durfee tells us that contemporaneous construction 
is best and gives us, on p. 56 of the work cited above, an 
extract from a charge to the Newport grand jury in 1843 
delivered by his father, Chief Justice Job Durfee, from 
which it appears that the elder statesman held substantially 
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the same views as the younger. He might have added that 
in the same year one William G. Goddard, a professor of 
moral philosophy and metaphysics at Brown University, de-
livered an address to the people of Rhode Island on the 
occasion of the change from the charter government to the 
constitutional, in which he expressed similar convictions but 
in the vague and uncertain language commonly employed by 
non-lawyers in treating of legal subjects. No other contem-
porary seems to have expressed similar views. But if these 
two gentlemen held this opinion on the question there were 
many who held the opposite. On March 14, 1842 there ap-
peared in a newspaper in the city of Providence "The Nine 
Lawyers' Opinion" signed by the leaders of the Rhode Island 
bar, Samuel Y. Atwell, Joseph K. Angell, Thomas F. Car-
penter, David Daniels, Thomas W. Dorr, Levi C. Eaton, John 
P. Knowles, Dutee J . Pearce and Aaron White, J r . This was 
reprinted as No. 11 of Rhode Island Historical Tracts pub-
lished a t Providence in 1880 by Sidney S. Rider. The pur-
pose of the opinion was to justify the legitimacy of the Peo-
ple's Constitution and the government elected under it. The 
concluding paragraph of this opinion is contemporaneous 
construction by the leaders of our bar at the very time of 
the adoption of the constitution. I t reads, "The authorities 
go much far ther than the case presented in Rhode Island, 
where we have no Charter, Constitution, Law or usage, which 
prescribes any mode of amending the Government; and they 
assert, and in the clearest and most express language, that 
where there is a Constitution, the people are not bound to 
proceed in the manner prescribed in i t for i ts own amend-
ment, though this way may be more convenient or expedient; 
but that they may rightfully proceed in the mode and man-
ner which they deem most proper." 
In the year of the adoption of our present constitution 
two other constitutions had been proposed and voted upon 
210 
by the people of Rhode Island, the so-called "Landholders 
Constitution" and the "People's Constitution". Each of these 
documents contained the language of Article X I I I and neith-
er made express provision for the calling of constitutional 
conventions. The "People's Constitution" was framed and 
adopted by a convention November 18, 1841; the existing 
constitution was framed by a convention one year later. The 
framers of the "People's Constitution" held the doctrine that 
the people had the right and power to assemble and adopt a 
new constitution by the convention method without the ap-
proval of the General Assembly and even against its will, 
and that this right was inherent and inalienable. Yet they 
embodied in their constitution the identical provisions which 
it is argued relinquish and surrender this power. No person 
who has the slightest acquaintance with Rhode Island affairs 
at this period will pretend for a minute that Governor Dorr 
and his supporters so interpreted the language used in Ar-
ticle X I I I as to take away the right of the people to revise 
their constitution by means of a convention. Here is con-
temporary construction of a nature that cannot be disre-
garded. 
In December 1842, one month after the present constitu-
tion had been voted on by the people qualified to vote under 
the Charter, the Democratic State Convention assembled 
and adopted resolutions recommending to the democrats of 
the state to register for the purpose of voting for state offi-
cers under the constitution but added, "That in recommend-
ing this course, and in order to avoid all doubt or miscon-
struction of our purposes, we explicitly avow our object to 
be, to accomplish in a satisfactory manner, and with the 
least delay, the establishment in fact, as well as in right, of 
the people's constitution." This object they sought to attain 
at their first opportunity and the general assembly in 1853, 
at its May session, passed an Act providing for a constitu-
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tional convention subject to the approval of the electorate. 
At an election held June 28, 1853, the act was rejected. At 
its session in October of the same year the general assembly 
passed an act for a convention to revise the constitution 
subject to the approval of the voters. At an election held 
November 21, 1853, the act was rejected. What about these 
acts, providing for constitutional conventions? Were not 
these contemporaneous constructions? The fact that they 
were rejected in the first instance by 1712 votes and in the 
second by 3840 votes is no proof of the existence of any con-
temporaneous conviction on the part of the electors of the 
state that the legislature lacked the power to make these 
proposals but is proof positive of a conviction on the part of 
the legislators that they possessed that power. 
PRECEDENTS FROM OTHER STATES 
While the Constitutional Convention which framed the 
constitution of the United States was considering the ques-
tion of how it should be submitted, it was well understood 
that the ratification of it in any particular state necessarily 
involved a change in the constitution of that state, for, by it, 
the powers of the local legislatures and other organs of gov-
ernment were profoundly affected. Most of the state con-
stitutions in 1788 had no provisions for constitutional con-
ventions and in Maryland and in Delaware a specific mode 
of change was expressly pointed out. Here is the account 
given by George Ticknor Curtis, in his Constitution of the 
United States, Vol. II , p. 482, of the reasons which influ-
enced the framers of the United States Constitution to pro-
vide for the convention method in submitting that instru-
ment : 
"Then came the question, in what mode the assent of the 
people of the States was to be given. The constitution of 
one of the States (Maryland) provided that it should be 
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altered only in a prescribed mode; and it was said that the 
adoption of the Constitution now proposed would involve 
extensive changes in the constitution of every State. This 
was equally true of the constitutions of those States which 
had provided no mode for making such changes, and in 
which the State officers were all bound by oath to support 
the existing constitution. These difficulties, however, were 
by no means insurmountable. I t was universally acknowl-
edged that the people of a State were the fountain of all 
political power, and if, in the method of appealing to them, 
the consent of the State government that such appeal should 
be made were involved, there could be no question that the 
proceeding would be in accordance with what had always 
been regarded as a cardinal principle of American liberty. 
For, since the birth of that liberty, it had been always as-
sumed that, when it has become necessary to ascertain the 
will of the people on a new exigency, it is for the existing 
legislative power to provide for it by an ordinary act of legis-
lation." 
The constitution of Maryland, adopted in 1776 and then 
in force, contained no provision for the calling of a constitu-
tional convention and contained no general declaration of 
the right of the people such as now forms Article I Section 
1 of ours. I t did contain this section: "LIX That the Form 
of Government and Declaration of Eights, and no par t there-
of, shall be altered, changed or abolished unless a bill so to 
alter, change or abolish the same pass the General Assembly, 
and be published at least three months before a new election, 
and shall be confirmed by the General Assembly af ter a new 
election of Delegates in the first session after such new elec-
tion." If the maxim expressio unius were applied here, as 
contended for by Judge Durfee and his followers, this would 
be the only way in which the Maryland constitution could 
be amended. Now, obviously, the adoption of the Constitu-
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tion of the United States in Maryland would be an amend-
ment or alteration to the State constitution. The Maryland 
general asembly, however, promptly passed an act in Decem-
ber, 1788, without the publication for three months or the 
confirmation of a new assembly, calling a constitutional con-
vention which in April, 1789, ratified the United States Con-
stitution. 
Of course, in 1788, the Maryland legislature did not have 
the benefit of the opinion of either the elder or the younger 
Judge Durfee. But in 1850 that opinion was available and, 
nevertheless, the Maryland general assembly felt itself free 
from the bonds of the Durfee application of expressio unius 
and passed an act for a convention which met in Annapolis 
in tha t year and framed a constitution for the state which 
was ratified by the people of Maryland June 4, 1851. 
In Massachusetts the original constitution of 1790 con-
tained no provision for amendment. In 1820 a convention 
was held which adopted the first nine amendments. These 
were ratified by the people. The ninth amendment is, with 
slight differences of phraseology, the same as our Article 
XI I I . I t provides for the proposing of amendments by the 
legislature. Notwithstanding this express provision, two 
constitutional conventions have been held in that state, one 
in 1853 and the other in 1916. The first came to nothing but 
the second framed several amendments, which, by popular 
vote, have become part of the Massachusetts constitution. 
The rather ambiguous opinion of the Justices, given in 1833, 
but never published in the Massachusetts Reports until 1850, 
in 6 Cushing 573, was not interpreted by the legislatures in 
1853 and 1916 in accord with the Durfee theory. Nor did the 
Hon. Samuel W. McCall, Governor of Massachusetts in 1916, 
hold this view of it, when in his inaugural message January 
6, 1916, he said: " I believe the time has come when our 
constitutional system should receive tha t connected and 
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careful revision which it can best receive from a convention 
chosen for the purpose." The Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts also, in Loring vs. Young 239 Mass. 349, de-
cided in 1921, at least tacitly approved the legitimacy of the 
convention of 1916. 
The Delaware constitution of 1776 declared that certain 
parts thereof should never be changed in any manner and 
that the remaining parts might be amended by the vote of 
five-sevenths of the lower house of the legislature and the 
vote of seven members of the upper house. This specific 
method was ignored and in 1792 a new constitution was 
framed by a convention and adopted by the people. This con-
stitution changed not only the parts declared amendable by 
the previous constitution but also those which were to share 
the distinction of the laws of the Medes and the Persians. 
The constitution of Pennsylvania adopted in 1838 and in 
force until 1873 contained a specific provision for amend-
ments to be proposed by the legislature and no provision for 
the calling of a constitutional convention. In 1873 a con-
vention was called and did adopt a constitution which was 
ratified by the people. The legitimacy of this action was af-
firmed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Wells vs. 
Bain, 75 Penn. St. 39 and Wood's Appeal, 75 Penn. St. 59. 
In Louisiana the constitution of 1898 contained no pro-
vision for the calling of a constitutional convention but did 
contain an express provision permitting the proposal of 
amendments to the people by the General Assembly with the 
concurrence of two-thirds of all the members elected to each 
house. This method was disregarded and a constitutional 
convention adopted the Constitution of 1913 which was rati-
fied by the people. The legality of this constitution was con-
tested in the courts by the American Sugar Refining Co. 
which objected to some of its provisions for the suppression 
of monopolies and in State vs. American Sugar Refining Co., 
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137 La. 407, the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the 1913 
constitution. 
On both logical and historical grounds the answer of this 
court to the questions propounded should be in the affirma-
tive. The better reasoning, the opinion of eminent writers, 
the contemporary interpretation, and the example of the 
other states, all point but one way, that the people of Rhode 
Island have the right to alter or amend their constitution by 
the method of a convention which, as Chief Justice Marshall 
says, is "the only manner in which they can act safely, ef-
fectively and wisely." 
Respectfully submitted, 
J A M E S T . GREENE. 
State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations 
Supreme Court 
IN RE: 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
BRIEF 
HAS THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY POWER TO PRO-
VIDE BY LAW THAT THE GENERAL OFFICERS 
OF THE STATE SHALL BY VIRTUE OF THEIR 
OFFICES BE MEMBERS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION? 
GEORGE AJOOTIAN 
Member of Rhode Island Bar 
State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations 
S u p r e m e C o u r t 
In Re: Constitutional Convention 
STATEMENT OF SCOPE OF BRIEF 
This brief will be confined solely to a consideration of sub-
division (c) of the question of law upon which His Excel-
lency, Theodore Francis Green, Governor of the State of 
Rhode Island, has requested the judges of the Supreme Court 
to give their written opinion, namely: 
"Would it be a valid exercise of the legislative 
power if the General Assembly should provide 
by law: 
(c) That the General Officers of the state 
shall by virtue of their offices be members of 
such convention:" 
There must necessarily be assumed, for the purposes of 
this brief and argument, the existence of an inherent legisla-
tive power to call a Constitutional Convention notwithstand-
ing the fact that the constitution of this state itself points 
out how it may be amended. I t might also be added, that 
the decided weight of authority and the more numerous pre-
cedents are arrayed on the side of the doctrine that has been 
assumed to exist for the purposes of this brief. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The General Assembly Has No Power to Provide By 
Law That Any Person or Certain Persons Shall Be Mem-
bers of a Constitutional Convention. 
The leading case in support of the proposition that the 
General Assembly has no power to provide by law that the 
General Officers of the state shall by virtue of their offices 
be members of the convention is Goodrich vs. Moore, 2 Minn. 
61, which was an application for a writ of injunction by 
Goodrich, the state printer, to restrain the defendant from 
publishing the journals and proceedings of the Consti-
tutional Convention. The plaintiff alleged that he was 
elected state printer by the legislature and that it was his 
duty as such "to do the incidental printing of each House 
of the Legislature, to print the journals and pamphlet laws 
and all such other Territorial or State printing as may 
accrue during the recess of the Legislative Assembly". The 
plaintiff also alleged that the legislature appropriated 
$30,000 for the expenses of a Constitutional Convention in-
cluding the printing and all other incidental expenses. The 
court denied the writ of injunction on three grounds, to 
wit : 
1. The plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law because 
no irreparable damage will ensue. 
2. The legislature of Minnesota did not intend to include 
in the plaintiff's duties the right to print the Convention 
proceedings, because "There is no reason to suppose that at 
the time of the passage of this act, the Legislature had at all 
in view the assembling of a Constitutional Convention, nor 
that they assumed the right in any manner to control its pro-
ceedings or interfere with its legitimate functions". 
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3. Finally, the court decided that even had the Legisla-
ture intended and attempted to claim and exercise the act 
of providing a printer for the Constitutional Convention, it 
would have been unauthorized and unwarrantable interfer-
ence with the rights of that body and the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota, af ter declaring the Constitutional Convention to 
be "the highest legislative assembly recognized in law" said: 
" I t has full control of all its proceedings and may 
provide in such manner as it sees fit to perpetuate its 
records and altho the convention may have been called 
together by legislative authority, that body has no right 
to select officers for the convention or otherwise control 
the transaction of its legitimate business . . . . the ad-
mission of such a right in the legislature would place 
the convention under its entire control; . . . i t would 
have less power than a town meeting and be incompet-
ent to perform the objects for which it was convened. 
I t would be absurd to suppose a constitutional conven-
tion had only such limited authority. I t is the highest 
legislative assembly recognized in law, invested with 
the right of enacting or framing the supreme law of the 
state. I t must have plenary power for this and all the 
incidents thereof. The fact that the convention was 
assembled by the authority of the legislature renders 
it in no respect inferior thereto, as it may well be 
claimed whether, had the legislature refused to make 
provision for calling the convention, the people in their 
sovereign capacity would not have had the right to have 
taken such measure for confirming the adoption of the 
constitution as to them seems meet." 
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held in 
the case of Loomis vs. Jackson, 6 W. Va. 613, 708; 
"First—That a constitutional convention lawfully con-
vened does not derive its powers from the legislature, 
but from the people. 
Second—That the powers of a constitutional convention 
are in the nature of sovereign powers. 
Third—That the legislature can neither limit nor re-
strict them in the exercise of these powers". 
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POINT II 
The People of the State Have the Right to Elect Their 
Own Delegates to a Constitutional Convention and Any 
Legislative Interference With That Right is Invalid. 
Constitutions are ordained and established by the people 
of a sovereign state or county. Hence it is essential that all 
of the delegates to a Constitutional Convention be elected 
directly by the people. 
The preamble of the present constitution of Rhode Island 
indicates very explicitly that it emanates from the people. 
"We, the people of the State of Rhode Island and 
Providence Plantations, grateful to Almighty God for 
the civil and religious liberty which he hath so long 
permitted us to enjoy . . . do ordain and establish 
this constitution of government". 
Likewise, the Constitution of the United States by its pre-
amble indicates that sovereignty rests with the people. I t is 
a compact between people and not between states. 
"We, the people of the United States, in order to form 
a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic 
tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote 
the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty 
to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish 
this Constitution for the United States of America". 
In the words of Chief Justice Burford, in the case of 
Frantz et al. vs. Autry, 16 Okl. 631: 
"In the American form of republican government, 
sovereignty rests in the people, and is exercised through 
representatives. In forming a constitution and state 
government the people act through their representa-
tives in the convention, but they do not delegate all 
their legislative power to the convention. They re-
serve unto themselves the power of final approval or 
disapproval. The convention formulates, proposes, and 
submits proposals for the form of government and the 
fundamental laws; the people in their sovereign capaci-
ty enact these provisions into law". 
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Proper constitutional procedure requires that any and all 
the delegates to a law-enacting body of such momentous im-
portance be elected directly by the people—it is not enough 
that they be elected or designated by the representatives of 
the people. 
The following excerpt from the case of Sproule vs. Fred-
ericks, 68 Miss. 898, 904 indicates the nature of a Constitu-
tional Convention: 
"I t is the highest representative body known to 
freemen in a representative government. I t is supreme 
in its sphere. It wields the power of sovereignty, spe-
cially delegated to it for the purpose and the occasion 
by the whole electoral body, for the good of the whole 
commonwealth. The sole limitation upon its powers 
is, that no change in the form of government shall be 
done or attempted". 
Note the language of the court where it says " I t (the con-
vention ) wields the power of sovereignty specially delegated 
to it for the purposes and the occasion by the whole electoral 
body . . . " While it must be conceded that the general offi-
cers are representatives of the people, it can hardly be said 
that they are representatives of the people for the purpose 
and occasion of a constitutional convention. 
Words of similar effect may be found in the case of In re 
Denny, 156 Ind. 104, 59 N. E. 359, where the court said: 
"In our system of government, a written constitution 
is the highest expression of law; none other emanates 
directly from the sovereign people themselves. I t is 
the deliberate and affirmative utterance of the sov-
ereign majority". 
The Honorable Elihu Root, one of the ablest lawyers and 
statesmen of this country, in speaking of the importance of 
the independence of the convention said: 
" I t is far more important that a Constitutional Con-
vention should possess these safeguards of its inde-
pendence than it is for an ordinary legislature; 
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because the convention acts are of a more momentous 
and lasting consequence and because it has the power 
to pass upon the power, emoluments and the very ex-
istence of the judicial and legislative officers who 
might otherwise interfere with it. The convention 
furnishes the only way by which the people can exer-
cise their will, in respect of these officers, and their 
control over the convention would be wholly incom-
patible with the free exercise of that will".—Report 
of Judiciary Committee, Elihu Root, Chairman, N. Y. 
Const. Conv. (1894) pages 79, 80. 
Mr. Livingston in the New York Constitutional Convention 
of 1821 thus stated the position of the members of the con-
vention : 
"The people are here themselves, they are present 
in their delegates. No restrictions limit our proceed-
ings, we are standing on the foundations of society".— 
Proceedings of N. Y. Const. Conv. p. 199. 
The fact that the ultimate power to approve or reject the 
proposed constitution remains with the whole body of elec-
torate will not satisfy the requirement that all the delegates 
to the convention be chosen directly by the people, because 
the power of rejection or ratification is strictly limited to the 
particular constitution proposed by the convention and un-
less the people are represented by their delegates to the con-
vention, the part which they perform in determining the ac-
tual structure and contents of the Constitution will be most 
insignificant. 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the foregoing authorities and the basic principle 
underlying our form of government: that the sovereignty 
rests with the people, and therefore they have the right to 
elect delegates expressly for the purpose of proposing 
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a constitution, and finally to accept or reject such constitu-
tion, the irresistible conclusion is that a Constitutional Con-
vention is, and ought to be, free from all legislative interfer-
ence, and therefore it is respectfully but earnestly submitted 
that subdivision (c) of the question of law submitted by his 
Excellency, Theodore Francis Green, Governor of the State 
of Rhode Island, be answered in the negative. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE AJOOTIAN. 
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Excellency, Governor Theodore Francis Green, on 
the Legality of Holding a Constitutional Convention 
to Amend the Present Constitution of Rhode Island. 
B R I E F OF 
EDGAR V. F. McCRILLIS 
This is a proceeding brought according to Section I I I of 
Article X as amended by Section I I of Amendment IX of the 
Constitution of Rhode Island, in which His Excellency, the 
Governor of the State of Rhode Island, has asked this Court 
to prepare its opinion on the following questions of law: 
"Would it be a valid exercise of the legislative power 
if the General Assembly should provide by law 
" ( a ) for a convention to be called to revise or amend 
the Constitution of the State: 
" (b ) that the Governor shall call for the election at 
a date to be fixed by him, of delegates to such conven-
tion in such number and manner as the General Assem-
bly may determine: 
" (c ) that the General officers of the State shall by 
virtue of their offices be members of such convention: 
" ( d ) for the organization and conduct of such con-
vention : 
" (e) for the submission to the people, for their rati-
fication and adoption, of any Constitution or amend-
ments proposed by such convention; and 
" ( f ) for declaring the result and effect of the vote 
of a majority of the electors voting upon the question 
of such ratification and adoption?" 
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POINT 
THE MODE OF AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION 
OF RHODE ISLAND AS SET FORTH IN ARTICLE 
XIII OF THAT INSTRUMENT DOES NOT EX-
CLUDE OTHER LEGAL MODES OF AMEND-
MENT. 
ARGUMENT 
In view of the decision rendered in the Opinion of the Jus-
tices,, 14 R. I., 649, which held that article of the present 
Rhode Island Constitution formed the exclusive method of 
legally amending that instrument. 
I t becomes necessary before deciding any of the questions 
presented in this case to determine whether the Constitution 
of Rhode Island can be amended by a constitutional conven-
tion, although that instrument does not provide for amend-
ment by that method. 
There are two clear ways of amending a Constitution: 
1. The mode provided in the existing Constitution. 
2. A revolution. 
There can be no question that if the people revolt and suc-
ceed in setting up a new government contrary to and in defi-
ance of the old government that the new government would 
supplant the old and that the question of whether this was 
a legal proceeding or not can never arise in the Courts set 
up by the new government. 
See Luther vs. Borden, 7 How., 1 
Miller vs. Johnson, 92 Ky., 589 
The question then presents itself whether the Constitution 
may legally and without revolution be amended by a conven-
tion of the people; that is to say, whether a convention of the 
people may meet and revise in whole or in part the existing 
framework of government in a manner not inconsistent with 
that existing framework. The mode of amendment set forth 
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in Article X I I I of the Rhode Island Constitution provides 
that the legislature may at two different sessions propose an 
amendment to the Constitution, and if passed by the legisla-
ture at those two sessions, may be submitted to the people 
for their approval or disapproval. If the people answer fav-
orably there will be a valid amendment to the Constitution. 
This is the only specific mode of amendment. 
There is no question but that the political framework of 
the State of Rhode Island is based upon republican princi-
ples. 
"The United States shall guarantee to every State in 
this Union a republican form of government." 
U. 8. Constitution Art. IV, Sec. IV. 
Webster has defined a republican form of government as 
follows: 
"A State in which the sovereign power resides in a 
certain body of the people and is exercised by represen-
tatives elected by and responsible to them . . . . republi-
can now often specifically implies such a free popular 
government in which there are no classes having any ex-
clusive political privileges, and in which the electorate 
includes at least the great body of adult male inhabi-
tants under constitutional restrictions." 
When the people of this State undertook in 1843 to make a 
Constitution they asserted the right to govern themselves. 
They undertook to solve the problem of self-government, to 
establish a government not distinct from and adverse to the 
people, but a government of the people themselves, to be ad-
ministered by and through the people acting, of course, not 
in their collective and primary capacity, because that was 
impossible, but, as they could only act, through agents ap-
pointed to do their work and their will. They undertook to 
make their own government in the sense that it is a govern-
ment that they made and created for their own purposes to 
be administered by their own hands, acting through the in-
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strumentality of officers and agents. The people are thus 
the creators of legislatures, but they themselves are not a 
legislature. They can make the frame of government, estab-
lish, define, and construct its great departments and clothe 
them with their several powers. They can elect to office or 
remove from office. They can set up and keep the whole 
agency in motion. This done, the people repose on their sov-
ereignty and supervise their servants in their several spheres 
of political employment. They are constituted and they re-
main the source of all power. They having made a Constitu-
tion have given a power of attorney therein to the legislature 
to make statute laws under that constitution, and as long as 
that power of attorney exists the principle cannot exercise a 
power which he has expressly conferred upon his agent. 
But then comes the question—Is the power irrevocable? 
Can the principle revoke his power of attorney? In ordinary 
transactions the terms of power determine this matter, and 
the principle is precisely the same with regard to the power 
of the people. So long as their Constitution exists it is a 
power of attorney, giving to their agents and representatives 
a power therein expressly conveyed; but it should not be 
irrevocable. The officers and office holders have been cre-
ated agents, but they have no such interest in their agency 
so as to make the agency irrevocable. Therefore, whenever 
the people choose to revoke their power of attorney they can 
do so. This is the fundamental principle in republicanism. 
If the people have power to make a Constitution there is no 
statute of limitations that foreclose the exercise of that 
power. As the people alone have an incontestible, unalien-
able, and indefeasible right to institute governments, they 
should also have the power to reform, alter, or totally change 
the same when their protection, safety, prosperity, and hap-
piness require it. The power of creation implies the power to 
alter, change, or destroy. 
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I t is true that the Constitution of the State of Rhode 
Island has not specifically reserved to the people the right 
of amending that Constitution by a convention, but on the 
other hand, there is no mention in that instrument of any 
surrender of such a power. If they have never given away 
power it is useless to speaks of powers reserved. The sover-
eign has no need to make reservations of power not given, be-
cause the sovereign loses nothing by making no reservations. 
In the absence of such express surrender there is a broad un-
derlying principle of government which runs over and above 
the Constitution tha t the people can alter or change their 
framework of government in a mode different from the mode 
set up in that Constitution. 
"In considering state constitutions we must not com-
mit the mistake of supposing that, because individual 
rights are guarded and protected by them, they must 
also be considered as owing their origin to them. These 
instruments measure the powers of the rulers, but they 
do not measure the rights of the governed." 
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 68. 
I t is to be noted that Section I of Article I of the Constitu-
tion of Rhode Island reads as follows: 
"In the words of the Father of His Country, we de-
clare that the basis of our political societies is the right 
of the people to make and alter their Constitutions of 
government." 
This is a clear recognition that the people are the authors 
and not the incidents of government. Having made the gov-
ernment they do not thereby become mere incidents of gov-
ernment so that they can never alter or change it without 
its consent, and therefore there is meaning in Article I of 
Section 1 of our Constitution where it declares that the 
people have the right to make and alter their Constitution. 
The framers of our Constitution certainly never intended to 
restrict the right of the people to modernize their system of 
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government to the whim of the legislature. This would be 
the result if the mode of amendment provided in Article 
X I I I of the Constitution of Rhode Island were the exclusive 
method of amendment. In speaking of a similar provision in 
the Constitution of Pennsylvania the Supreme Court of that 
State said: 
"If it should appear that such a power (to amend the 
Constitution by convention, although that mode is not 
mentioned in the existing Constitution) has been so rec-
ognized and acted upon frequently as a fundamental 
principle underlying all free government, this provision 
will appear to be a solemn declaration of the existence 
of such a right and may in ordinary parlance fairly be 
said without any great breach of legal accuracy to con-
fer a power under the Constitution." 
Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa., 59. 
I t is to be observed that nearly every one of the older 
States of this Union has amended its form of government by 
constitutional conventions at least once, and the new govern-
ments so set up have been recognized as legal. 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island in the opinion report-
ed in 14 R. I., 649, decided that the method of amendment as 
provided in Article X I I I of the Rhode Island Constitution is 
the only method whereby that instrument can be legally 
amended. I t decided that the mention of one mode of amend-
ment was an intention to exclude other modes. 
I t is true that this argument is one very generally used 
in the interpretation of contracts between man and man, but 
I submit that it should not be applied to such a great in-
strument as a Constitution. 
Mr. Jameson, in his work on constitutional conventions 
says, with great force, upon this question: 
"Viewed upon principle, were there no authority upon 
the point, it would be doubtful whether, dealing in great 
questions of politics and government, the same maxim 
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ought to prevail which regulates the construction of con-
tracts between man and man. As a matter of specula-
tion it may be admitted that the rule expresses the 
weight of probability equally in cases of great and small 
magnitude. But there is always a doubt; and between 
the cases indicated there is the wide difference that in 
ordinary contracts it is possible to enforce the construc-
tion which the courts shall pronounce the true one, 
whilst in the case of constitutional provisions regulating 
great organic movements, to hold such a maxim applic-
able would be, by presenting barriers to the attainment 
of what the people generally desire, to make that revo-
lutionary which perhaps was not so. 
"Where the intention of the framers of a Constitution 
is doubtful, the people, assuming power under the 
broader construction, should have the benefit of the 
doubt; and that all the more because in opposition to 
them our courts are comparatively powerless. I t is in-
finitely better where no principle is violated that a Con-
stitution should be so construed as to make their action 
legal rather than illegal." 
" I do not understand that there is anything in the 
terms of this provision of the Constitution which makes 
it the sole and only mode in which the provisions of the 
Constitution are to be amended. I do not understand 
the principle to be that the mention of one mode ex-
cludes all the other modes which would have existed 
but for the mention of that mode. What is the principle 
upon this subject? I admit the principle in common 
law that the designation of one person or one thing in 
some instances is exclusive of all others; but does that 
principle apply to this case? That principle applies to 
all cases where, from the necessity or the nature of the 
case it is shown to be the intent that other things should 
be excluded. If there is but one mode of several to be 
adopted, and one mode is prescribed, of course that ex-
cludes all the others. I may go farther than that. I t 
may be t rue from the nature of the case, one mode being 
set down, that no other was intended, or in contempla-
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tion; but it is not so in this case. Is not this mode of 
amending the Constitution, which is prescribed in the 
Constitution in express terms, perfectly consistent with 
the other mode, by a Convention of delegates? There 
is no antagonism between the two modes. The people 
say by their Constitution, 'We will have a convenient 
mode by which this instrument can be amended without 
a Convention, and we will therefore embody a provision 
that the opinion of two successive legislatures that the 
Constitution ought to be amended shall be submitted to 
us for our action without the expense of a Convention.' 
Does this exclude the idea that a convention may be held 
when there is nothing antagonistic between the two 
modes? By no means! Sir, I do not stand alone in this 
opinion. I am supported in it by eminent writers on 
constitutional law. I will read an extract from Mr. 
Rawle's Treatise on the Constitution, and one whose 
opinions are entitled to high respect. He says: 
" 'The laws of one legislature may be repealed by an-
other legislature, and the power to repeal them cannot 
be withheld by the power that enacted them. So the 
people may, on the same principle, at any time, alter or 
abolish the Constitution they have framed. This has 
been frequently and peaceably done by several of these 
States since 1776. If a particular mode of effecting such 
alterations has been agreed on, it is most convenient to 
adhere to it, but it is not exclusively binding'." 
I Debates Massachusetts Const. Conv. 1856, 153. 
" I t has been generally recognized that to legally 
change the Constitution by convention without a spe-
cific authority in the Constitution having been given to 
that effect that the legislature under the existing Con-
stitution must join with the people to propose the new 
Constitution." 
6 R. C. L., 27. See also Barto vs. Himrod, 4 N. Y., 
583. 
"I t would seem as though the question as to whether 
the calling of a constitutional convention was a legal 
exercise of power by the legislature, should now be con-
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sidered by all judicial tribunals as settled so firmly as a 
part of the common law of our governments, that any 
attempt to disturb i t a t this day would savor more of 
revolution than legitimacy. He would be bold, indeed, 
who would now assert that all these conventions were 
usurpations, and that all the Constitutions proposed by 
them and adopted by the people were revolutionary." 
Woods Appeal, 75 Pa., 59. 
POINT 
THE LEGISLATURE MAY NOT OF ITS OWN MO-
TION ISSUE A CALL FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION WITHOUT FIRST ASCERTAINING 
THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE UPON THE SPECIFIC 
QUESTION WHETHER OR NOT THE PEOPLE 
DESIRE SUCH A CONVENTION. 
As the people alone were the creators of the Constitution, 
they alone may say whether they desire to amend their crea-
tion. The legislature is nothing but the agent of the people 
for such specific purposes as are set forth in the Constitution. 
Nowhere in the Constitution is any power given to the 
legislature to revise the Constitution. If the legislature has 
no power of itself to revise, can it by force of its own act 
compel the people to hold a convention to revise the Con-
stitution? The only grant of power along these lines con-
tained in the Constitution is the power to propose specific 
amendments. What is that power? Is it a limitation of the 
power of the legislature or state, a limitation of power of the 
people "to make and alter their Constitutions of Govern-
ment?" When the people of this State assembled in 1843 and 
chose certain delegates who framed the present Constitution 
and sent that instrument out to the people asking them to 
say yes or no, the people did not at that time part with their 
sovereignty and close their political existence except upon 
sufferance by action of the legislature. 
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The power of the legislature in regard to a constitutional 
convention is simply to take the initiatory movement of mak-
ing propositions to the people. This doctrine is based upon 
the fundamental principle that power is emanated from the 
people where it lies sovereign and inalienable. When the 
legislature goes further than its enumerated power, and in-
stead of proposing to the people an amendment, steps aside 
from the terms of the Constitution and proposes a conven-
tion, that is neither anything constitutional nor unconstitu-
tional, it is simply a proposition. I t has no vitality and can-
not bind anybody until it comes to the act of the people. The 
people vote upon it and if they say yes, that puts the breath 
of life into it. But until that time it is nothing. 
While an agent may ask his principle to reform the terms 
of his employment, yet he may not command the principle to 
change those terms. An analogy may be drawn between the 
power of the people to change our Constitution and the legal 
requirements that an instrument, deed, or contract can be 
set aside or changed only by an instrument, deed, or contract 
of like power, no matter whether it be parole, written, or 
sealed. These the people have made a Constitution, and they 
alone can revoke it. No agent of theirs can undertake or at-
tempt to do so. No agent can take the first step towards it 
unless especially ordered by them at first, or sanctioned or 
affirmed by them subsequently. 
In the words of the Father of his Country, 
"We declare that the basis of our political societies 
is the right of the people to make and alter their Con-
stitutions of government." 
Section I, Article I, Constitution of R. I. 
"The legislature has no inherent rights. I ts powers 
are derived from the Constitution, and hence, where 
some action of the legislative body, which action is 
outside of the particular field fixed by the Constitution 
and is not strictly legislative within the meaning of 
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Section I, Article 4, supra, is sought to be justified, a 
warrant, for the same must be found somewhere; if not 
in the Constitution, then directly from the people, who, 
by the terms of Section I, Article I, of the Bill of Rights, 
have retained the right to amend or change their form 
of government. The right of the people in this regard 
is supreme, subject, however, to the condition that no 
new form of a Constitution can be established on the 
ruins of the old without some action on the part of the 
representatives of the old, indicating their acquiescence 
therein; and, the General Assembly being the closest 
representative of the old, its approval must be obtained 
by some affirmative act. This is the only orderly way 
that could be conceived. The question then arises, How 
may these, the people and the legislature, get together 
on this proposition? If no positive rule is provided by 
the fundamental law of the state, then, if a custom has 
prevailed for a sufficient length of years so that it is 
said to be fully established, that rule or custom must 
prevail. 
" I t seems to be an almost universal custom in all of 
the states of the Union, where the Constitution itself 
does not provide for the calling of a constitutional con-
vention, to ascertain first the will of the people and pro-
cure from them a commission to call such a convention 
before the legislature proceeds to do so. The people be-
ing the repository of the right to alter or reform its gov-
ernment, i ts will and wishes must be consulted before 
the legislature can proceed to call a convention." 
Bennett vs. Jackson, 186 Ind., 533. 
"Nor can it be said that it is an empty form to leave 
to popular vote the grave question whether the people 
shall assemble in convention and revise their fundament-
al law. True it is that the power to take the initiative 
with respect to the calling of a constitutional conven-
tion resides in the legislature. In the absence of any 
provision in the Constitution on the subject that body 
alone can give legality to such a convention. If its foun-
dation is the spontaneous action of the people without 
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permissive legislative authority, the movement is revo-
lutionary . . . but while the power resides in the legisla-
ture, and that body only to call a constitutional conven-
tion, it is obvious that the agents of the people who have 
not been selected on that particular issue should not 
take upon themselves the responsibility of burdening the 
people with the expense of such a movement without 
first submitting to them the question whether they desire 
such a convention to be called." 
State vs. Dahl, 6 N. D., 81. 
"The customary manner of calling constitutional con-
ventions in the United States is by resolution of the leg-
islature, followed by a submission of the question to the 
electorate." 
6 R. C. L., 27. 
See also Miller vs. Johnson92 Ky., 539. 
I t is therefore submitted that questions (a) and (b) con-
tained in the request of His Excellency, the Governor, should 
be answered in the negative. 
POINT 
THE LEGISLATURE HAS NO RIGHT TO SAY WHO 
THE MEMBERS OR ANY MEMBER OR MEMBERS 
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION SHALL 
BE. 
"Where a change in the Constitution is made under 
proceedings initiated by the legislature, it is not because 
the legislature possess any inherent power to change the 
existing Constitution through a convention, but because 
it is the only means through which an authorized con-
sent of the whole people, the entire State, can be law-
fully obtained." 
6 R. C. L., 27. 
The people themselves are the only parties who can make a 
Constitution. Of course, the people draf t a proposed new 
Constitution through their agents. These agents must rep-
resent the people under a specific authorization; that is, to 
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draft a new Constitution. The agents of the people for one 
purpose are the agents of the people for that purpose alone. 
The general officers of the State have been elected with cer-
tain powers to carry out certain carefully enumerated du-
ties. No part of their duties as enumerated under the Con-
stitution of Rhode Island includes the power of changing 
or proposing changes in the fundamental structure of the 
law to their principles. While the legislature has power to 
propose to the people the calling of a Convention, it is to be 
noticed that the consent of the general officers of the State 
is not needed for the validity of such a proposal. Indeed, it 
has been held that the signature of the Governor is not only 
not necessary to such a resolution of the legislature, but that 
he has no veto power under such acts; nor does the consent 
or disapproval of any other of the general officers of the 
State have any effect upon such a proposal. 
See 12 C. J., 693, N. 89, 90. 
See also Commonwealth vs. Griest, 196 Pa., 396. 
Morris vs. Sec. of State, 43 La., Ann., 590. 
Warfield vs. Vandiver, 101 Md., 78, 116 to 121. 
Hollingsworth vs. Virginia, 3 Dall., 378. 
If, therefore, the general officers have no concern with pro-
posing a new Constitution, how much less can the legisla-
ture make such officers a part of the Convention to draf t a 
new Constitution? 
Members of a constitutional convention represent the peo-
ple, not the people and the members of the old government. 
The legislature, the creature of the people, cannot tell the 
people who their representatives shall be. 
In 1894 the state of New York had under consideration the 
revision of i ts state constitution. One of the first questions 
that arose in the convention was the ascertainment of the 
rights and powers of the convention to pass upon the election 
and qualifications of one of its members. This question was 
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referred to the judiciary committee, of which committee the 
Honorable Elihu Root, formerly secretary of state, and one 
of the ablest lawyers and statesmen of this country, was 
chairman. In his report to the convention, he says: 
"The convention has been created by the direct action 
of the people and has been by them vested with the pow-
er and charged with the duty to revise and amend the 
organic law of the state. 
"The function with which it is thus charged is a part 
of the highest and most solemn act of popular sover-
eignty and in its performance the convention has and 
can have no superior but the people themselves. 
"No court or legislature or executive officer has au-
thority to interfere with the exercise of the powers or 
the performance of the duties which the people have en-
joined upon this, their immediate a g e n t . . . . 
" I t is fa r more important that a constitutional con-
vention should possess these safeguards of its independ-
ence than it is for an ordinary legislature; because the 
convention acts are of a more momentous and lasting 
consequence and because it has to pass upon the power, 
emoluments and the very existence of the judicial and 
legislative officers who might otherwise interfere with 
it. The convention furnishes the only way by which the 
people can exercise their will, in respect of these offi-
cers, and their control over the convention would be 
wholly incompatible with the free exercise of that will." 
Proceedings of the New York Constitutional Convention, 
1894, pages 70-80. 
The delegates to the convention were not the agents or 
representatives of congress, but they were the immediate 
agents and representatives of the people of the two terri-
tories. They derived their power and authority from the 
people in their sovereign capacity. And this is in harmony 
with the principles of the Declaration of Independence, 
which declares that "Governments are instituted among men, 
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed," 
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and is in keeping with the doctrine announced by Lincoln 
when he uttered the immortal words, that this is "A govern-
ment of the people, by the people, and for the people." 
Franz et al vs. Autry, Oklahoma 81, 589. 
"The better view would seem to be that the conven-
tion is a regular organ of the state (although as a rule 
called only at long intervals)—neither sovereign nor 
subordinate to the legislature, but independent within 
its proper sphere. Under this view the legislature can-
not bind the convention as to what shall be placed in the 
Constitution, or as to the exercise of i ts proper duties. 
If, then, we say that the convention is independent of 
the regular legislature in the exercise of its proper du-
ties, i t will be necessary to discuss for a moment what 
are its proper functions. These are simply to propose a 
new Constitution or to propose constitutional amend-
ments to the people for approval; or, in states where the 
submission of Constitutions is not required to frame and 
adopt a Constitution if they think proper. In this sphere, 
and in the exercise of powers incidental to its proper 
functions, it would seem that constitutional conventions 
should not be subject to control by legislative acts. As a 
rule, then, constitutional conventions are subject only to 
the following restrictions: (1) Those contained in or 
implied from provisions in the existing state and federal 
Constitutions; and (2) in the absence of constitutional 
provisions, those derived or implied from the limited 
functions of conventions. To these restrictions Jameson 
and others would add those imposed by legislative acts 
under which conventions are called, but such restric-
tions are certainly not yet recognized as of absolute 
binding force, except in Pennsylvania, and should not be 
so recognized if the convention is to be an instrument of 
great usefulness." 
Dodd, Revision and Amendment of State Constitu-
tions, 80, 92 (1910). 
I t is therefore submitted that the question numbered (c), 
contained in the request of His Excellency, the Governor, 
should be answered in the negative. 
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POINT 
THE LEGISLATURE MAY MAKE PROVISION FOR 
CALLING TOGETHER THE DELEGATES ELECT-
ED TO A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, BUT 
MAY NOT INTERFERE WITH THE FURTHER 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION. 
ARGUMENT 
The whole power of a constitutional convention is derived 
from the vote of the people and not from the legislature. As 
the actions of a constitutional convention are something 
without the Constitution, the legislature has no power to go 
beyond its own limitations as defined by the Constitution. 
As they have been given no express powers in regard to a 
convention, they cannot act to make rules for the conduct of 
such a convention. As the general argument under this point 
rests upon the arguments and authorities cited in the pre-
vious point, no further argument on this point will be made 
at this time. 
As it would be idle to submit the question of ratification 
or rejection of a proposed new Constitution to the voters 
unless means were taken to ascertain the result of such a 
vote, it is submitted that question ( f ) contained in the re-
quest of His Excellency, the Governor, should also be an-
swered in the affirmative. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDGAR V . F . MCCRILLIS. 
